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Abstract
The first essay examines whether systematic equity risk of firms reflects the risk of their R&D
strategies at various angles. More novel R&D strategy is risky because it can be related to more
extreme outcome. This risk could indirectly affect the firm’s systematic risk. In the case of success
of the strategy, the productivity of technologies developed by novel R&D strategy could be pro-
cyclical; thus public firms with more novel technologies could be more subject to the aggregate
risk. To investigate this problem, I devise an ex-ante measure for the novelty of innovation, Tech
Synthesis Level (below TSL), which quantifies the degree that new technology is drawn from prior
technologies in the far different technological fields, using patent citations. I find that patents
with high TSL are associated with more extreme technological outcomes both at patent-level and
startup-level. At public firm analyses, I find that high TSL is associated with high abnormal returns
by 2.532 percent (annualized) and high systematic volatility. These findings support the hypothesis
that a failure probability of the R&D project increases systematic risk. I also find evidence that
high TSL patents are technologically more productive when aggregate innovation is very active, so
firms with high TSL patents are subject to high systematic equity risk.
The second essay studies the effect of intangible collateral, which has gradually increased since
the ’90s, by testing hypotheses inspired by [Ai et al., 2018]’s collateralizability premium. Firms
with more collateralizable capital have lower stock returns due to the insurance effect of the capital
during economic recessions when financial constraints get tighter. If intangible collateral also can
relax financial constraint, firms with intangible collateral are expected to have lower stock returns
than the other similar firms without collateralizable intangible capital. I add empirical evidence by
using Dealscan data of US-originated secured long-term loans. I find that firms using intangibles
as collateral in addition to traditional collateralizable assets have higher stock returns than the
other firms pledging only tangible assets to secure corporate loans. Also, they could achieve the
ii
similar or even slightly higher level of leverage, implying intangible collateral also can relax financial
constraint. This is not assumed possible in many theoretical and empirical studies. Even with
matching analysis I find that firms pledging intangible capital as collateral still have higher stock
returns than the other similar firms without intangible collateral. The empirical evidence I find
does not fully support the collateralizability premium hypothesis.
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Chapter 1
Creation by Connecting the Dots:
The Risks and Rewards of Novel
Innovation
1.1 Introduction
This paper examines whether the systematic equity risk of firms reflects the risk of their R&D
strategies. Previous studies have found answers to this question. Some studies show that the
quantitative aspects of innovation matter for stock returns by using proxy variables such as the
amount of R&D expenses or the intensity of R&D activities. For example, [Hirshleifer et al., 2013]
argues that innovation efficiency, which is measured by the standardized number of forward citations
that a firm’s patents receive, predicts the cross-section of stock returns. However, there are fewer
studies in the finance literature that discuss how the qualitative aspects of firm-level innovation
affect the firm and stock returns. When considering a firm as a collection of R&D projects, it
is reasonable to question whether the qualitative dimension of R&D projects, in other words, the
R&D strategy of a firm, affects firm-level outcomes and, ultimately, the equity risk.
One representative quality of innovation is novelty. In a Harvard Business Review article,
[Hopp et al., 2018] summarizes 40 years of research in disruptive innovation. They define disruptive
innovation as the creation of new knowledge and the commercialization of completely novel ideas or
products while incremental innovation is defined as the improvement of previous technology. The
authors state that novel innovation focuses on long-term impact and is disruptive, bringing change
in the relationship between customers and suppliers and creating unprecedented product categories.
The authors state that in most cases, firms depend on advancements in technologies to achieve novel
innovation.
In addition, [Ahuja and Lampert, 2001] study how large established firms’ performs break-
through innovations. They define novel technologies as new and unfamiliar technologies to firms
in which the firms do not have enough prior experiences or expertise. Therefore researching and
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developing novel technologies requires significant costs of learning new knowledge. They also find
that the exploration of novel technologies for large firms is positively associated with breakthrough
innovation. Thus, novel technologies are expensive to develop but bring technological breakthrough
and consequent economic success. However, not all novel technologies are related to breakthrough
innovation or success, it could be subject to higher variability in the outcome ([Fleming, 2001]).
Also, even in the case of success, the novel innovation may take a longer time to be fully realized
([Verhoeven et al., 2016]).
Therefore, it is plausible to expect that novel innovation is associated with greater growth
opportunity through higher technological and economic impacts conditional on its success. At the
same time, novel innovation can have a greater likelihood of failure in R&D process because it
is difficult to develop the disruptive technology. Also, it could be more exposed to risk of being
obsolete when the market is not ready to adopt new innovation. Additionally, novel innovation
may entail higher costs than non-novel innovation due to its technological difficulty as in [Ahuja
and Lampert, 2001] and [Verhoeven et al., 2016]. In summary, novel innovation may be related
to extreme outcomes, a greater likelihood of failure, and a more significant technological impact
because the innovation is used by the associated field’s technologies and the technologies of other
fields conditional on its development completion(success).
Considering the innate riskiness of novel innovation, it is plausible to assume that there are some
differences between firms pursuing novel innovation and firms pursuing incremental innovation while
viewing a firm as a collection of R&D projects. In this paper, I empirically study the effect of the
novelty of innovation on various patent outcomes, early-stage firms, and public firms. By putting
together all the evidence from the analyses, I find channels where the extent of novelty of an R&D
strategy affects systematic equity risk in the cross-section of stock returns.
How can novelty of innovation be defined and measured precisely with existing data? What
types of innovation are novel? Steve Jobs, the former CEO of Apple, gave his opinion on creativity
in an interview with Wired magazine([Wolf, 1996]) as in the following quote:
“Creativity is just connecting things. When you ask creative people how they did some-
thing, they feel a little guilty because they didn’t really do it, they just saw something.
It seemed obvious to them after a while.”
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Opinions similar to that of Jobs exist whereby true innovation is believed to stem from the unique
recombination of existing things ([Dahlin and Behrens, 2005],[Kaplan and Vakili, 2015],[Verhoeven
et al., 2016]). Borrowing this idea, I define novelty of innovation as the creation of new technology
by connecting prior technologies in far different fields from the created technology. Therefore, the
critical quality to quantify is the technological distance in the technology space. The difference
between technologies can be measured by the distance between two technologies in the technology
space. To compute this distance, I use patents’ backward citations to compute technological distance
empirically. Because all US patents must disclose information material to patentability that is
relevant to prior patents, almost all patents have backward citations. Therefore, this information is
an excellent source of knowledge for the computing of technological distance for almost all patents.
I define the average technological distance Tech Synthesis Level (TSL).
For example, if a medical diagnostic technology is built upon civil engineering technologies,
the medical technology is considered to be novel because medical technologies does not have much
overlap with civil engineering technology. Also, one can think of an analogy with journal papers.
If a finance paper draws new financial knowledge mostly from psychology papers and neuroscience
papers rather than finance papers, it is considered very novel finance paper with the novelty defined
above. In other words, the novelty of innovation defined above is also unique recombination of prior
technologies that has not been tried by many people.
My main findings are as follows1: At patent-level, I find that higher TSL is associated with a
greater likelihood of winning an innovative product award and also a greater likelihood of failing to
maintain the patent(early expiration). These findings imply that TSL is an ex-ante proxy for the
risk associated with outcomes. In other words, a patent that uses outside-the-box technologies is
more likely to meet with either huge success or huge failure.
In addition, by using a novel dataset from Crunchbase, I find that startups pursuing more novel
innovation represented by high TSL are more likely to go public by running multinomial logit regres-
sion with various exit types of startups on TSL. These startups require higher investments (funding
amounts) for research and to develop the technologies. These findings support the hypothesis that
high TSL technology could bring highly successful outcomes at the firm level but requires more costs
1For detailed description of empirical methodology, please refer to Section 1.3
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and thus have high chance of failure. On the other hand, TSL has no significant relationship with
other types of startup exits such as being acquired by larger private or public firms. If one views
that being acquired implies a deterministic outcome to a venture while an IPO implies an uncertain
(risky) future outcome, it is reasonable to conclude that pursuing a high TSL R&D strategy for a
venture is related to a risky outcome than deterministic outcome.
Does this effect of TSL aggregate at public firm level? [Hirshleifer et al., 2018] shows that
Innovative Originality is one technological characteristic that is aggregated at firm level and has
some effects on stock returns, defining Innovative Originality as a measure for breadth of knowledge
inputs. Similarly, I find that a technological distance represented by TSL is also aggregated at public
firm level and has a positive association with stock returns and systematic risk. The technological
breadth and distance are two major aspects of the technological complexion of both an invention’s
roots and its impact([Jaffe and de Rassenfosse, ]). The breadth cares about the variety of the
knowledge inputs for an invention, while the distance cares about the closeness between the invention
and its knowledge inputs. For example [Trajtenberg et al., 1997] studies how the technological
breadth(originality) and distance are related to technological impact.
For the firm-level analyses, I find that higher TSL is associated with (1) higher firm-level returns
using Fama–MacBeth regression and a high TSL portfolio has higher abnormal returns of 2.532
percent (annualized) compared to a low TSL portfolio. (2) An increase in future return volatility
(total and systematic) and ROA volatility but no increase in idiosyncratic volatility with panel
regression. The findings imply a possibility that TSL is priced in the cross-section of stock returns
subject to some type of systematic risk source. Alternatively, the findings support a meaningful
association between TSL and systematic equity risk.
I suggest a possible channel that explain the positive association between TSL and systematic
equity risk. First, firms with high TSL can have high co-movement with aggregate innovation
productivity because novel innovation is related to higher technological impact; novel technology is
used by more post-technologies in various fields conditional on its successful development. If this
is the case, and innovation productivity risk carries the positive price of risk, firms with high TSL
have a higher risk premium. I find indirect evidence that high TSL patents are more productive
when the aggregate innovation level is high. I also support the channel by showing that TSL
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factor series is positively correlated with aggregate knowledge capital productivity shock, which has
positive correlation around 0.3 with aggregate consumption shock. In addition, knowledge capital
productivity risk has a positive slope coefficient in the cross-sectional regression with various test
asset portfolios. Finally, when firm-level beta to intangible capital productivity shock is included in
the Fama–MacBeth regression, TSL’s explanatory power becomes statistically insignificant, which
implies that the effect of TSL is subsumed by knowledge capital productivity risk. This implies
that TSL captures the systematic risk associated with knowledge capital productivity.
Of course alternative explanations for why TSL should be positively related to firm risk and
stock returns are also possible. For example, TSL could be one of the idiosyncratic risks but it can
affect systematic risk indirectly suggested in [Berk et al., 2004]. The failure risk associated with
novel R&D strategy can indirectly change the risk premium. [Berk et al., 2004] show that the failure
risk of an R&D project can indirectly increase systematic risk in their theoretical model. They view
a firm as a multi-stage R&D project. The firm has option to invest in the next stage of R&D project
at the end of each R&D stage, and realizes future cash flows upon its completion of the multi-stage
R&D project. Thus the firm is considered as a compound option on future cash flows. The failure
risk of each R&D stage increases the threshold of an option to invest in the next-stage R&D project.
If the investment is not made, a firm as a compound option on future cash flows has a higher risk
premium due to unresolved uncertainty. Thus, failure risk can indirectly increase systematic risk.
The finding in this paper that high TSL is associated with a higher likelihood of patent failure and
high stock returns supports the model in [Berk et al., 2004], because a patent’s failure which is an
early expiration is considered as happening in a new product/process development stage.
This paper contributes to the literature on innovation and the cross-section of stock returns. To
my knowledge, that this is the first paper that reveals a relationship between technological distance
and various innovation outcomes including firm dynamics and the cross-section of stock returns.
Additionally, this paper provides evidence that the association stems from systematic risk.
This paper also contributes to the innovation literature by suggesting a new novelty measure
for innovation, which shows the extent to which a new patented technology is built upon extremely
different prior technologies and its association with more extreme outcomes. The novelty measure,
TSL, could be useful in evaluating technological impact or riskiness of R&D strategy ex-ante to not
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only investors but also corporate management.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents a literature review. Section 1.3 explains
the empirical methodology used in the analyses in detail. Section 1.4 describes the data used in the
paper. Section 1.5 presents the findings with a discussion, and Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
There has been long-standing debate as to the definition of novel innovation and how it is related to
technological and economic outcomes. As stated in Section 1.1, one opinion is that novel innovation
is a result of unexpected re-combination. Others argue that novel innovation is creation from
almost nothing, occurs typically near the beginning of the technological trajectory, and is highly
original([Trajtenberg et al., 1997]).
[Dahlin and Behrens, 2005] states that novel invention should satisfy two conditions. First, a
novel invention recombines prior arts in a new and different way. Second, many patents issued after
a novel invention should imitate the novel invention’s way of recombining prior technologies. The
authors find this hypothesis to be true at least within the domain of tennis racket technology.
[Verhoeven et al., 2016] define novel technology in a similar way. The authors argue that a
technology is novel in two dimensions, (1) novelty in recombination and (2) novelty in knowledge
origins. The authors find that technological novelty is positively related to the variance of the
technological impact.
This discussion exists in other research domains other than innovation. In 2013, [Uzzi et al.,
2013] published an interesting article about atypical combinations of journal disciplines and their
scientific impact in Science. The authors argue that balancing atypical knowledge with conventional
knowledge may be the most important factor that links a study’s novelty and its scholarly impact
in the future.
In this paper, I focus on recombination-type innovation because it is relatively easily measured
with empirical data. There are far fewer patents that do not have any backward references. The
majority of these are probably a result of missing information, and not a lack of reference to any
prior art, since US patent law clearly states the obligation to disclose material references. Although
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there is no clear definition in the innovation literature for a truly novel innovation, whether it
be recombination or creation from a zero-base, I add evidence that recombination-type innovation
could be novel and technologically valuable.
In terms of measuring TSL, I use technological distance between technological classes. A well-
known study by [Jaffe, 1989] is the first paper to attempt to measure technological closeness between
two firms’ patent portfolios by using cosine similarity. If two firms have a similar distribution of
technological classes in their portfolios, they are deemed to be close technologically. Inspired by this
paper, I measure technological class-level closeness using cosine similarity and use it to calculate
patent-level tech synthesis degree.
There are various papers that discuss optimal measures for technological distance. For example,
[Younge and Kuhn, 2016] devise a text-based vector space model to measure patent-to-patent
similarity. This captures previously unseen similarity between patents under a discrete technological
classification system and requires a machine-learning technique.
[Yan and Luo, 2017] compares 12 technological distance measures to identify one that represents
technological network consistently over time and has high correlation with other measures. The
authors conclude that a normalized co-reference-based measure has high correlation with other
patent network maps drawn from different distance measures and is also highly consistent over
time. The authors find that class-to-class cosine similarity performs worse than co-reference-based
distance. For the purposes of technological network mapping and analysis, it may be necessary to
follow [Yan and Luo, 2017].
However, based on my analysis, while not reported, co-reference-based distance is extremely
skewed and, thus, it is difficult to show variability across pairs of technological classes. Cosine
similarity-based distance is still highly skewed but less so than co-reference-based distance. This
fact is also reported in [Yan and Luo, 2017]. Thus, I choose conventional cosine similarity to measure
technological distance between two patent classes.
This paper contributes to the literature on the relationship between innovation and the cross-
section of stock returns. There are several papers that find that R&D intensity and efficiency matter
for stock returns([Hirshleifer et al., 2013],[Chan et al., 2002]), but they focus on quantitative aspects
of innovation not qualitative aspects.
7
A recent paper by [Hirshleifer et al., 2018] focuses on the qualitative aspects of innovation, which
they call Innovative Originality. The authors study the relationship between Innovative Originality
and the cross-section of stock returns in a behavioral economics sense. Firms with high Innovative
Originality are difficult to value and are subject to high valuation uncertainty. This can cause firms
to be undervalued and, consequently, to have higher stock returns. The authors also found that
Innovative Originality predicts higher, more persistent, and less volatile profitability. Innovative
Originality is defined as the total number of unique technological classes of patents to which a focal
patent refers. Thus, Innovative Originality measures the breadth of the knowledge used in a patent
while TSL focuses on the degree of difference between the originating patent and its backward
references. [Hirshleifer et al., 2018] does not use technological distance information between the
originating patent and its backward citations. Therefore, it is clear that what TSL measures is
different from Innovative Originality. The difference between the technological distance and the
originality is also documented in [Trajtenberg et al., 1997]. This current paper is also distinguished
from [Hirshleifer et al., 2018] because I explain the cross-sectional difference using a systematic risk
story.
There are a strand of papers that innovation is systematically risky. For example, [Hsu, 2009]
empirically shows that technological innovation increase expected stock returns and premiums at
the aggregate level by showing that shocks to innovation measured by patent flow and R&D flow are
positively related to aggregate expected stock returns. The pattern is demonstrated internationally.
In this paper, I find that novel technological innovation productivity is pro-cyclical and system-
atically risky, consistent with the findings in [Hsu, 2009]. I use forward citations as a measure of
innovation productivity while [Hsu, 2009] uses the number of patents and R&D stock as a measure
of innovation productivity.
There is another recent study on the technological closeness of two firms and the cross-predictability
of stock returns by [Lee et al., 2018]. This study uses classic measures of technological closeness
between two firms’ patent portfolios to determine technologically close firms. The authors’ chan-
nel leans more toward behavioral explanations, namely, that return predictability stems from slow
price adjustment to more nuanced technological news transmitted via the technological link. The
technological peer firm’s stock return predicts the originating firm’s stock return after controlling
8
for industry fixed effect. This effect is stronger for firms with intense and specific technology focus
with limited investor attention measured by analyst coverage. This paper studies the effect of in-
formation transfer through technological links but not the effect of technological characteristics on
a firm’s stock returns.
This paper also contributes to the literature concerning how to measure the value of innovation.
For example, [Kogan et al., 2017] suggests an event study as a way to measure the private value
of individual patents. TSL could be an ex-ante measure of technological value and impact, and it
can be used together with the private value measure in [Kogan et al., 2017] to assess the value of
patents from various perspectives.
1.3 Empirical Strategy
To find evidence supporting the hypothesis that the characteristics of an R&D strategy affect
systematic risk and stock returns (see section 1.1), I exhaustively investigate how TSL is related to
outcomes at three different levels—patents, early-stage ventures, and public firms. First, I explain
how to compute the novelty measure, TSL , in detail. Next, I explain how I determine whether
the TSL is an appropriate measure for the riskiness of novel innovation with patent-level analysis.
Then, I identify the association between a firm’s R&D strategy (firm-level TSL) and firm outcomes
and stock returns. Finally, I explain an empirical strategy that determines systematic risk channels
to explain the empirical findings above.
1.3.1 The Novelty Measure: TSL
To measure the novelty of innovation in terms of technological distance, I first measure how far a
pair of technological classes are from each other using backward citations of US patents. Backward
citations are the prior arts that are cited by a patent. I use CosineSimilarity to measure the
class level closeness and then subtract it from 1 to make it a proper distance measure. The cosine
similarity measures how similar the backward citations distributions over all technological classes
are between two technological classes. Simply, CosineSimilarity is a correlation coefficient between
two distributions of backward citations. Thus, CosineSimilarity lies between 0 and 1. If a pair
of technological classes have exactly the same backward citation distribution, the cosine similarity
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between the two classes is 1. If, by contrast, the backward citations profiles do not have any
technological classes in common, the cosine similarity between the two classes should have a value
of 0. Using equation (1.1) and equation (1.2), I measure technological distances between a patent in
class i and its backward-referenced prior arts in class j for each year in the sample. Since the number
of backward citations from class i to class j varies over time, technological distance between the two
classes also varies over time. I count backward citations from class i to class j from the beginning
of the sample period (year 1976) to year t and take it as Cij,t in equation(1.1)2. Consequently, the












TechnologicalDistacneij,t = 1− CosineSimilarityij,t (1.2)
where Cik,t : the number of backward citations of class i to class k from 1976 to year t
Cjk,t : the number of backward citations of class j to class k from 1976 to year t
Next, I take the mean of TechnologicalDistanceij,t−1 over all backward citations of an originat-
ing patent p in class i to be the technological distance (TSL) of the patent p issued in year t (equa-
tion(1.3)). To remove technological class-fixed effect, I subtract the average TechnologicalDistance
of class i. This measure is similar to a weighted average of the backward citations. A high number
implies that the originating patent is based upon very different prior patents. After removing the






TechnologicalDistanceij −Avg.TSLi ∀j = 1, 2, . . . , J (1.3)
Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of TSLp. It is centered around zero, which implies that the
majority of the patents have TSL of its class mean. If a patent lies on the right tail, the patent
refers to starkly different prior patents on average. For an analogy, patents lying on the right tail
are similar to those in finance papers that refer mostly to biology and psychology journals rather
2The reason I only count the number of citations from the year 1976 is limited data. The US Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) only provides complete citations data for patents issued from the year 1976.
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than finance or economics journals.
Figure 1.1: TSL Histogram (Patents issued from 1976 to 2010)
1.3.2 Valildating TSL as a technological risk measure
I first show that TSL predicts extreme technological outcomes at the patent level. In this way, I can
plausibly say that TSL captures the riskiness of novel R&D strategy and whether it brings success
or failure. I use winning an R&D award as a proxy for a highly successful technological outcome. I
obtain a list of products that received an R&D 100 award and match it with relevant patents used
in the product development. As I discuss in section 1.4, R&D100 awards are given to the top 100
revolutionary technologies of the past year and are often referred to as the Oscars of invention. I
first identify patents related to awarded products and assign a value of 1 to an indicator variable
representing the receiving of an award. I run a logit regression of the indicator variable on TSL and
other control variables. This shows if TSL positively predicts the likelihood of receiving an award,
which represents a successful technological outcome.
Pr(Iaward,p,i,t = 1) =
1
1 + exp(α+ β1TSLp + ΣβxControlsp + Y earFE)
(1.4)
Next, I choose an early expiration of a patent due to failure to pay a maintenance fee as a proxy
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for an extremely negative outcome. The US patent system requires mandatory renewal fees for
patents at the end of the fourth, eighth, and 12th year. If these fees are not paid, the patent expires
right away. These fees for a patent are in the range of several hundred dollars for individuals to
around eight thousand dollars for firms3. From the perspective of an entire R&D project, issued
patents are still be used in development of new products or processes. Therefore, early expiration of
a patent can be considered as a failure in development. To determine if high TSL patents are more
likely to fail, I run a logit regression of an indicator variable for patent expiration on TSL and other
control variables. The dependent variable has value of 1 if a patent fails to pay a maintenance fee
and the patent is expired(equation(1.5)). I include a patent’s economic value as a control variable
to see if the reason behind early patent expiration is its economic value rather than technological
novelty.
Pr(Iexpire,p,i,t = 1) =
1
1 + exp(α+ β1TSLp + ΣβxControlsp + Y earFE)
(1.5)
I also investigate if TSL is related to more extreme outcomes at the firm level, particularly with
a startup sample. Although the ultimate goal of this paper is to provide empirical evidence of the
positive relationship between TSL and stock returns with a public firm sample, the marginal impact
of a patent is not economically significant to many public firms that have huge patent portfolios.
The relationships with patent-level TSL would be more noticeable with a sample that is composed
of firms that are more affected by one more patent and its qualitative characteristic. Startups
fit well with this condition because they typically have no patent or a small number of patents.
According to [Dalle et al., 2017], only 50,000 firms among 447,000 listed in CrunchBase4 own one or
more patents. This is slightly more than 10 percent. In other words, around 90 percent of startups
worldwide do not have any patent at all. Thus, adding one issued patent to an empty portfolio
should have a greater significant impact for startups compared to publicly listed firms that add one
more patent to their huge patent portfolio. I admit that startups and public firms do not share
many common characteristics, but I believe investigating the startups could help to explain how
novel innovation is related to firm risk and the extent of the effect.
The biggest limitation problem is that startups do not have any stock return data. Instead, I
3The numbers are based on a 2014 USPTO maintenance fee system
4a commercial database providing startups’ basic and funding information
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consider the likelihood that going public changes as TSL increases. For startups, an IPO exit is the
greatest success. Therefore, If high TSL is truly associated with an extremely successful outcome, it
should increase the likelihood of going public for startups. To check the relationship between TSL
and the downside potential, I use unsuccessful exits("Closed") of startups as a proxy for failure. I run
multi-logit regression with various types of startup exits as a dependent variable(equation(1.6)). I
set the default case as "Not Having Exited the Startup Market Yet." The multi-logit regression shows
how much more likely it is that the firm will go public than the default case scenario. Additionally,
I include other types of startup-exit such as "Being Acquired by Other Firms" or "Expanding by
Making Acquisitions." All the coefficients show the relative propensity of the alternative scenario
to the default scenario.





∀n = 0, 1, .., 4 (1.6)
where n=0: Not having exited (default scenario), β(0) = 0
n=1: Closed (unsuccessful exit)
n=2: IPO (most successful exit)
n=3: Was acquired by other firms (less successful exit)
n=4: Made acquisitions (success without exit)
I also test if high TSL entails more costs. High research and development costs definitely
change the NPV of projects and increase the likelihood of failure. Consequently, high costs raise
the threshold for exercising the option to invest in next-stage R&D in the [Berk et al., 2004] model.
To my knowledge, there is no way to obtain financial statement information on startups unless they
go public. Therefore, I use the total funding amount as the total costs of investment assuming
startups raise funding to expense all the money in new investments, particularly for R&D. Then, I
run a regression on the total funding amount for TSL with other control variables. To be consistent
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with the hypothesis, high TSL should be associated with a high funding amount.
Yi = β0 + β1
1
T




T = The year of exit, if a startup has not exited then T is set to 7
1.3.3 TSL and firm risks
To find a link between TSL and firm risk, I run panel regressions for 60-month future volatility
of excess returns on TSL and other firm-level controls. In practice, the volatility of excess return
is used as a simple risk measure for a stock. I choose 60-month monthly return volatility because
innovations typically take time to be in effect. Although [Turan G. Bali, 2016] shows that the level
and distribution of excess return volatilities are similar regardless of the window used, volatility
based on daily returns within one month or three months would not reflect information on techno-
logical innovation compared to five-year monthly volatility. Specifically, if TSL is associated with
any type of systematic risk, it should have positive relation with systematic volatility but not with
idiosyncratic volatility. To address the concern for within-firm correlation between errors, I cluster
standard errors by firm.
V oli,t,t+5 = β0 + β1TSLi,t + Controls+ Y earFE + FirmFE + εi,t (1.9)
Additionally, it is plausible to investigate if profitability becomes more volatile as TSL increases.
I use ROA as a profitability measure and run a panel regression for five-year ROA volatility on TSL
and other control variables. The result of this regression reveals if TSL is positively associated with
future ROA volatility.
Next, I run Fama–MacBeth regression to see if TSL predicts stock returns in the cross-section
with various control variables. I form portfolios of stocks based on TSL and perform sorting anal-
ysis. If the HighTSL-minus-LowTSL portfolio has a positive and significant alpha controlling for
conventional factors, the risks related to TSL should be different from the conventional factors. I
explain empirical strategies to find out the new risk source in the next section 1.3.4.
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1.3.4 The systematic risk channel
(1) The direct channel through knowledge capital productivity
I suggest that a systematic risk source related to novelty R&D strategy is one associated with
knowledge capital productivity. Firms with high TSL can have high co-movement with aggregate
innovation productivity because novel innovation (high TSL type) is related to higher technological
applicability. This implies that novel innovation is used by more post-technologies in various fields
conditional on its successful development. Thus it is likely that there are more number of firms
or post technologies which requires the previous novel technology when overall economy is good
and innovation is more active, on the other hand, there would be less number of firms or post
technologies which utilize the previous novel technology in bad times when overall innovation is
less active. Therefore, due to its positive association with technological applicability, the high-TSL
type novel innovation can make a firm’s innovation productivity fluctuate more with the aggregate
economy-wide productivity. If this is the case, and innovation productivity risk carries the positive
price of risk, firms with high TSL have a higher risk premium.
I first find evidence directly at the patent level by showing whether patent-level TSL is more
productive when the overall economy-wide innovation is more active. A patent’s technological
productivity can be measured by the amount of forward citations it receives. If a patent is more
cited, it is considered to have a bigger technological impact, and thus more productive scientifically
and technologically. Also [Trajtenberg et al., 1997] show that technological distance of a patent is
positively associated with greater applicability in terms of that the patent is cited by other patents
in various fields. So I investigate if high TSL patents receive more citations when economy-wide
innovation is very active so that more number of forward citations for all patents are made.
In the first step, I estimate the co-movement between an individual patent’s productivity and
aggregate innovation productivity, which is βfcites. The high βfcites of a patent shows that it
receives more citations when overall economy-wide innovation is very active and thus more number
of citations are made. The βfcitesis obtained from time series regression of an individual patent’s
forward citations on aggregate forward citations(equation(1.10)). I replace missing forward citations
with zero. In this regression, I use relative forward citations that are adjusted for the technological
class-level fixed effect. Then, I run cross-sectional regression of βfcites on TSL to investigate if
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TSL has positive predictability on βfcites. If TSL turns out to be positively associated with βfcites,
it can be evidence for the hypothesis that TSL is positively related to pro-cyclical technological
productivity.
Fcitesp,t = β0,p + βfcites,pAggregateFcitest + εp,t (1.10)
βfcites,p = γ0 + γ1TSLp + γ2ξp + Controls+ εp (1.11)
Next, I test whether innovation productivity risk is one of the actual source of risk that is
captured by TSL. If not only the patent-level TSL but the firm-level TSL is also positively associated
with the aggregate innovation productivity, then a variable that captures a firm’s exposure to the
aggregate innovation productivity should subsume the explanatory power of TSL. Slightly different
from the patent-level analysis above (equation(1.10) and (1.11)), I measure the aggregate innovation
productivity by knowledge capital productivity of public firms. I test if the explanatory power of
TSL disappears when including β for aggregate knowledge capital productivity in the cross-sectional
regression of stock returns.
To complete this task, I first estimate aggregate knowledge capital productivity. I show that it
has a positive price of risk so that high TSL firms have high stock returns due to greater exposure
to knowledge capital productivity risk. Then, I estimate firm-level betas for the knowledge capital
productivity shock. Finally, I run a Fama–MacBeth regression with the betas and check if TSL
loses its statistical significance.
To estimate aggregate knowledge capital productivity, I borrow public firms’ knowledge capital
data from [Peters and Taylor, 2016]. Then, I run yearly cross-sectional regressions of firm-level
revenue(SALE) on tangible capital(PPENT), knowledge capital, other intangible capital year by
year to obtain a time series of knowledge capital productivity. All output and capital variables are
divided by number of employees(EMP), so the productivity is per-capita value as in equation 1.12.
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where Ktan,it = Tangible capital of firm i in year t
Kknow,it = Knowledge capital of firm i in year t
Kint,it = Other intangible capital of firm i in year t
Lit = The number of employees of firm i in year t
Each beta in equation(1.12) represents capital-specific productivity. For example, β2,t is knowl-
edge capital productivity in year t. Once I obtain the time series of capital-specific productivities, I
estimate exogenous shock for each productivity with the VAR(1) model(equation(1.13)). I estimate





























I use 130 test assets including 25 size-BM portfolios, 25 BM-investment portfolios, 25 size-
investment portfolios, 25 size-profitability portfolios, 25 profitability-investment portfolios, and 5
TSL portfolios. I first estimate betas by running time-series regression and then running cross-
sectional regression to determine if the slope coefficient of the knowledge capital productivity shock
(λ1 in equation(1.15)) is positive and significant. I run the time-series regression with entire series
to estimate betas, and then run the cross-sectional regression of time-series average portfolio excess
returns on estimated betas.
rep,t = αp + β1,pσknow,t + β2,pMKTRFt + β3,pHMLt + β4,pSMBt + β5,pUMD + +εp,t (1.14)
rep,t = λ0 + λ1β1,p + λ2β2,p + λ3β3,p + λ4β4,p + λ5β5,p + εp,t (1.15)
5I use GDP deflator for SALE, intangible capital deflator for knowledge capital and other intangible capital, and
physical capital deflator for tangible capital.
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If the primary source of return difference between high TSL stocks and low TSL stocks is
co-movement with aggregate knowledge capital productivity, adding βknow in the Fama–MacBeth
regression should reduce the statistical power of TSL dramatically because βknow is a direct measure
of co-movement between a stock return and aggregate knowledge capital productivity. I estimate
βknow by running 60-month-rolling-window regression of a firm’s stock returns on knowledge capital
productivity shock from month t-60 to t and match the βknow with month t+1. Then I run regression
in equation (1.16) to see if βknow subsumes TSL.
rei,t = γ0 + γ1TSLi + γ2βknow,i + Controlsi + IndustryFE + εi,t (1.16)
(2) An alternative indirect channel
As in [Berk et al., 2004], various types of idiosyncratic risks associated with R&D could indirectly
change a firm’s systematic risk and risk premium. One of the risks is the failure risk associated with
each R&D stage. Therefore, by providing empirical evidence that TSL is positively associated with
the likelihood of failure and also with stock returns systematically, I can support the mechanism
of the model in [Berk et al., 2004]. For the exercise validating TSL as the riskiness of the R&D
project described in section 1.3.2, I satisfy the first condition to provide evidence of the association
between TSL and the likelihood of failure. From the results of the analyses in section 1.3.3, I show
whether TSL is associated with systematic risks and stock returns. Altogether, I provide empirical
evidence supporting the hypothesis that the technological risks embedded in novel R&D projects
can indirectly increase systematic risk and stock returns by hindering the resolution of uncertainty
regarding whether to invest in the next stage of an R&D project.
1.4 Data
The sample period is from 1976 to 2010; thus, I can use public firm-patent maps provided by [Kogan
et al., 2017]. Firm-years without any patents are excluded because it is not possible to compute
TSL for these firm-years. For this reason, less than 1 percent of patents without any backward
references6 are excluded. Additionally, financial firms and utility firms are excluded based on SIC
6Backward references(citations) are the citations made by the originating patent to prior arts.
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codes (4900-4999, 6000-6999). Small firms with market capitalization of less than 2 million dollars
are excluded to reduce noise. Firms with negative book equity are excluded. To match financial data
and patent data, I borrow the patent-PERMNO(CRSP) matching table from [Kogan et al., 2017],
and COMPUSTAT book values are merged using the PERMNO-GVKEY link table. I perform
extensive text-matching works to match novel datasets such as R&D 100 awards or Crunchbase
with USPTO patents. I give detailed procedures in the relevant subsections below.
1.4.1 Financial Data
I use CRSP and COMPUSTAT to compute financial variables. CRSP data are from 1976 to 2010
while COMPUSTAT is from 1975 to 2009. All the book values are measured at the end of the fiscal
year t and merged with year t + 1 CRSP data. Market cap is measured by share price times the
number of shares outstanding. The book value of equity is defined as shareholder equity (SEQ)
plus deferred taxes(TXDITC, if available), minus preferred stock(PSTK ). If SEQ is not available,
I use common equity(CEQ) plus preferred equity(PSTK ) or assets(AT ) minus liabilities(LT ). If
PSTK is not available, I use redemption value(PSTKRV ) or liquidation value(PSTKL). Market
value of equity for the market-to-book ratio is measured at the end of the fiscal year. Intangible
assets(INTAN ) are standardized by total assets to avoid bias from firm size. R&D expenses(XRD)
are also standardized by total assets. Missing R&D expenses are zero only for firms that have
ever had non-zero R&D expenses. Return on assets (ROA), a profitability measure, is measured
by ordinary income before depreciation (OIBDP) divided by total assets(AT ). Return on equity
(ROE) has the same numerator as ROA but divided by fiscal year-end market capitalization. The
definitions of gross profits and operating leverage follow [NovyMarx, 2013], [Novy-Marx, 2011] each.
Stock betas are from WRDS beta suite, which is estimated using 60-month windows. I exclude firms
if the number of observations used is less than 24 months. I obtained firm-level intangible capital
data from [Peters and Taylor, 2016]. This data is available via WRDS. [Peters and Taylor, 2016]
suggest a new way to measure intangible capital of public firms in the Compustat-CRSP universe.
The authors decompose intangible capital into knowledge capital, organizational capital, and other
intangible capital. They also provide total Q considering the effect of intangible capital. I also
obtain consumption and GDP data from BEA.
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1.4.2 Patent Data
USPTO provides complete information on US patents from the year 1976. Although firm-level
data are available from the 1960s, because of the lack of patent information before 1976, the sample
includes firm-years starting from 1976. I use CRSP PERMNO and USPTO patent number mapping
data from [Kogan et al., 2017] for the sample period from 1976 to 2010. I also borrow patent-level
economic value data from [Kogan et al., 2017], which is extracted from the three-day abnormal
return around the patent issue date.
I use the USPC7 technological class to compute class-level technological distance and the sample
firms’ TSL. I use all patents with at least one backward citation with complete class information to
compute class-level technological distance. A patent’s TSL measures average technological distance
between an originating patent’s class and the classes of cited patents. It is adjusted to be centered
around the class’s average distance. A firm’s TSL is the average of the patent level measure across
all issued patents in a given year. It is between -1 (within-class innovation) and 1 (outside-the-box
innovation). Average forward citations measures how many times an originating patent receives
citations from other patents compared to its technological class mean forward citations until the
end of the sample period. If an originating patent has a value of 150%, this means that the patent
receives 1.5 times more forward citations compared to its class-level mean forward citations. Thus,
it is a little less affected by truncation bias because it is more like a cross-sectional measure after
removing class-level mean effect.
All the bulk patent data are obtained from Patentsview8.
The US patent system requires mandatory renewal fees for patents at the end of the fourth,
eighth, and 12th year. If these fees are not paid, the patent expires right away. USPTO provides a
dataset containing records of events related to maintenance fees. When an assignee fails to pay the
fee, the event description variable is coded with "EXP." I compute year-lags between the patent
issuance date and maintenance fee event date so that I can identify when a patent has expired.
7the US Patent Office’s description states "The USPC is a system for organizing all US patent documents and




1.4.3 Breakthrough Innovation Data
I classify breakthrough invention by two different measures: the number of forward citations and
the receipt of R&D awards. R&D100 awards are given to the top 100 revolutionary technologies of
the past year, and they are often referred to as the Oscars of invention. To receive the award, a new
technology or a product should be available for sale or licensing in the previous year. These data
are already studied in the innovation literature([Fontana et al., 2013]), but there is still room for
exploration. The history of R&D100 awards dates back to 1963, and the new significant products
or processes of the past years are such as the digital wristwatch, antilock brakes, the automated
teller machine, liquid crystal display, the halogen lamp, and the fax machine9. New inventions are
judged by experienced panels composed of professional consultants, university faculty members, and
industrial researchers10. The award winners include industry-leading corporations, public research
organizations, and universities. Past winners include well-known corporations and universities, so
the data is considered reliable as a reflection of truly novel inventions in the real world.
However, the award goes to products that could involve many different patents at the same time.
To match R&D100-awarded products to relevant patents, I compare the titles of awarded products
with those of patents, awarded organization names with patent assignee names, and the descriptions
of awarded products with patent abstracts. For example, if a product receives an award in 2018, I
match the awarded product with the awarded organization’s patents issued in the past five years
considering that R&D requires extensive time. For company name matching, I use a fuzzy string
match algorithm. For abstract matching, I use a word-token based TF-IDF algorithm. The number
of patents matched by awarded organization name and assignee name is 147,180. Among those
patents, 5.9 percent are matched with awarded products by title, and 13.5 percent are matched
with awarded products by either title or abstract.
1.4.4 Startup Data
I manually collected information on startups from Crunchbase Pro11. Crunchbase is a commercial
database with information on innovative startups, and it was created in 2007. Basic information
9https://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/rd-magazine-online
10https://www.rd100conference.com/rd-100-award-judging-process/
11For academic purposes, educational institutions can request free access to Crunchbase while individual users can
subscribe to Pro for access to more detailed information
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on firms includes organization, IPOs, M&As, and funding details. According to [Dalle et al.,
2017], Crunchbase is updated daily, and users can add to and edit the database. As of September
2017, more than 3,000 global investment firms submit monthly portfolio updates to Crunchbase in
exchange for free data access. Although the coverage of Crunchbase is not clearly defined, [Dalle
et al., 2017]’s analysis shows that aggregate statistics on Venture Capital funding by country and
year are similar to the numbers calculated from an alternative database, OECD Entrepreneurship
Financing Database.
I only include startups founded in 2010 in the sample for several reasons. In 2010, the overall
economy was recovering from the recent financial crisis; thus, startup foundations were possibly
less affected by extreme economic conditions. Panel B of Figure 1 in [Dalle et al., 2017] shows the
number of companies in the database by founding year, and more than 20,000 startups worldwide
are reported in Crunchbase for 2010. Additionally, it has been over seven years since 2010, which
is long enough to observe the successful or unsuccessful exits of these 20,000 startups. Therefore, I
choose U.S. startups founded in 2010 for the analysis.
After collecting all relevant information on the startups founded in 2010, I match US patents
with the startups by firm name and headquarter location. I first match them by names using a
fuzzy string match algorithm and then compare country- and state-level locations to ensure proper
matching.
There were 15,619 U.S. startups founded in 2010. Only 1,109 startups had at least one U.S.
patent issued by May 2016. Among the matched startups, approximately 856 startups have infor-
mation on funding amounts, exit status, and detailed investor information.
1.5 Findings and Discussion
1.5.1 Evidence from patents
Table 1.1 shows that high TSL is associated with a higher likelihood of receiving an R&D100
award(equation(1.4)). The columns (1), (2), and (3) use a matched sample on firm, title, and
abstract. First-awarded firms are matched with assignee names in the patent database. Then, I
narrow down the sample by matching awarded product titles with patent titles. I narrow down the
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sample further by matching awarded product descriptions with patent abstracts. This sample is
from 1997 to 2010 due to the non-existence of product descriptions before the year 1997.
Columns (4), (5), and (6) are based on a sample that matches R&D100-awarded products and
patents based on firm and title. Because the awarded product titles are provided from year 1963, I
obtain the sample from 1976 to 2010.
Patents included in this analysis are only from the technological classes that include awarded
patents. If there are no awarded patents in a technological class, the entire set of patents in the
class is excluded from the analysis.
Based on columns (1), (2), and (3), a one-unit increase in TSL increases the likelihood of receiv-
ing an R&D100 award more than 50 percent relative to the likelihood of not receiving an award. In
columns (4), (5), and (6), a one-unit increase in TSL increases the likelihood of receiving an R&D100
award by 18 percent compared to the probability of not receiving an award(equation(1.4)). I control
for year fixed effect and cluster standard errors at the technological class level. Because the awards
are given to the most innovative "product", I believe this practice helps to control for unobserv-
able variables regarding time and the possible correlation of errors within a technological class. In
summary, these results imply that TSL proxies for technological novelty and value. Additionally,
because R&D100 awards are given to commercialization-ready products, TSL could also capture
the potential commercial value of a technology.
Table 1.2 contains the logit regression of patent expiration on TSL and other control variables.
The dependent variable has a value of 1 if a patent has expired in the middle of its life. Patent
expiration is a definite case of failure in the mid-stages of development which corresponds to the
technological failure of an R&D stage in [Berk et al., 2004]. In columns (2) and (3) of Table 1.2,
TSL positively predicts the likelihood of expiration. The likelihood of failing to pay a maintenance
fee in the eighth year is approximately 1.1 times higher than the likelihood of keeping a patent alive.
Even in the 12th year, the odd ratio is still slightly higher than 1, which implies that patents with
high TSL are more likely to be abandoned before their natural termination.
However, TSL does not predict expiration in the fourth year as shown in column (1). This
could be because firms are more likely to actively develop their services or products with patented
technologies in the first three to four years. Thus, three years is not long enough for a firm to decide
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Table 1.1: Logit Regression: RND100 Awards and TSL
The sample period is from 1976 to 2010. A patent’s TSL measures the average technological distance between
an originating patent’s class and the classes of cited patents. It is adjusted to be centered around the class’s
average distance. If a patent is matched with the RND100-awarded products, the RND100 indicator variable
has a value of 1, otherwise 0. The number of backward citations is the total number of referenced patents
that an originating patent has. The number of self-citations is the total number of backward citations made
by the same assignee. The number of external citations is the total number of backward citations made by
examiners. The top 5 percent of forward citations is an indicator variable if a patent has the top 5% forward
citations relative to its technological class average. In columns (1), (2), and (3), awarded products are
matched with patents by assignee name, product title, and abstract. Due to missing abstract information,
the sample period for columns (1),(2), and (3) is from 1997 to 2010. In columns (4), (5), and (6), awarded
products are matched with patents by assignee name and product title. Standard errors are clustered by
the main technological class. The detailed empirical methodology is explained in Section 1.3.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES RND100 RND100 RND100 RND100(T) RND100(T) RND100(T)
TSL 0.495** 0.458** 0.497** 0.179*** 0.176*** 0.176***
(0.218) (0.217) (0.218) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060)
Economic Value 8.47e-04 -0.0127*
(7.59e-04) (0.007)
No. Backward Citations 7.65e-04 1.33e-04 7.53e-04 7.82e-04 6.65e-04 8.61e-04
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (7.53e-04) (7.65e-04) (7.44e-04)
No. Self Citations -0.166 -0.185 -0.161 0.212 0.211 0.193
(0.281) (0.279) (0.280) (0.165) (0.165) (0.160)
No. Examiner Citations -0.801 -0.817 -0.769 0.177 0.175 -0.069
(1.182) (1.182) (1.171) (0.912) (0.911) (0.896)
Top 5% Fcites 0.745*** 0.111**
(0.190) (0.056)
Constant -2.762** -2.778** -2.794** -2.660*** -2.666*** -2.604***
(1.193) (1.191) (1.182) (0.106) (0.106) (0.110)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 64,171 64,171 64,171 135,582 135,582 135,582
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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whether to abandon patents.
With the results in Table 1.1, I empirically show that TSL is related to the riskiness of tech-
nological outcomes. The higher the TSL, the more extreme the outcome. A patented technology
with fairly high TSL will either have a significant technological impact or be abandoned in the early
stages of its life.
Another interesting finding shown in the table is that the economic value of a patent predicts
the likelihood of expiration negatively. In other words, patents with positive stock market reactions
are less likely to fail. This finding supports the economic value measure for a patent suggested
by [Kogan et al., 2017] and also implicitly supports the view that stock market investors have the
ability to assess fair values of new technologies.
1.5.2 Evidence from startups
I find firm-level evidence that high TSL is associated with pursuing uncertainty by examining the
likelihood of an IPO from a startup. This also could provide evidence of a positive relation between
TSL and extreme success, which is an IPO. Table 1.3 shows the multinomial logit regression results
from the startup data. The dependent variable is a categorical variable. The default scenario is to
operate a company as a startup in the market. "IPO" represents the exit of a startup by going
public, "Was Acquired" represents the exit of a startup through an acquisition by another public or
private firm, "Made Acquisitions" represents a startup that expands their business area by acquiring
other startups or firms, and "Closed" represents the permanent exit of a startup from the market.
This multinomial logit regression shows the relative likelihood of each scenario compared to the
default case. The number of investors is the total number of individual and institutional investors
in a startup. The total funding over the total equity funding ratio shows the extent to which a
startup depends on equity financing. California is a dummy variable for startups headquartered
in California. Startups are geographically clustered around California as are venture capitalists.
Thus, being headquartered in California might affect the exit results. The ranking of total funding
is based on the total funding amount up until the year 2016. This could also affect the exit results
because some startups go public to access more funding in the public market rather than the private
lending market. This is consistent with the hypothesis that startups are slightly more likely to go
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Table 1.2: Logit Regression: Patent Expirations and TSL
The sample period is from 1976 to 2010. A patent’s TSL measures average technological distance between
an originating patent’s class and the classes of cited patents. It is adjusted to be centered around the class’s
average distance. The dependent variables are indicator variables, which have a value of 1 if a patent fails
to pay the maintenance fee and is expired. Exp(4th) indicates whether a patent is expired in the fourth
year after issuance. Exp(8th) indicates whether a patent is expired in the eighth year. Column(2) excludes
patents expired before the eighth year. Exp(12th) indicates whether a patent is expired in the 12th year.
Column(3) excludes patents expired before the 12th year. The dependent variable in column(4) has a value
of 1 for patents expired in the fourth year or the eighth year. The dependent variable in column(5) has a
value of 1 for patents expired in any year. The number of self-citations is the total number of backward
citations made by the same assignee. The number of external citations is the total number of backward
citations made by examiners. Standard errors are clustered by the main technological class. The detailed
empirical methodology is explained in Section 1.3.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Exp(4th) Exp(8th) Exp(12th) Exp(4th or 8th) Exp(Any year)
TSL 0.058 0.098*** 0.052*** 0.088*** 0.099***
(0.035) (0.029) (0.020) (0.030) (0.030)
Economic Value -0.001 -0.003* -0.003*** -0.002 -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
No. Backward Citations -0.005*** -0.003*** 8.27e-05 -0.004*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (3.20e-04) (0.001) (0.001)
No. Self-Citations -0.171 0.125** 0.163*** 0.0351 0.115*
(0.122) (0.053) (0.032) (0.073) (0.061)
No. Examiner Citations -0.223 -0.201* 0.144 -0.218* -0.081
(0.150) (0.119) (0.120) (0.114) (0.093)
Constant -1.743*** -1.176*** -4.182*** -0.639*** -0.710***
(0.151) (0.121) (0.129) (0.111) (0.0904)
Observations 1,110,203 1,013,296 988,079 1,110,203 1,110,203
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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public when their TSL is higher compared to stay-as-usual ventures. Additionally, more investors
decrease the probability of going public compared to the base case scenario. In addition, a higher
funding amount (rank) increases the likelihood of a firm going public but to a lesser extent than
TSL.
Being acquired by another firm could also proxy for the successful exit of a startup, but it is more
noisy than an IPO exit because incumbent firms sometimes acquire startups to obtain ownership
of their patents and technologies. In this case, an exit through acquisition is not as successful as
an exit using an IPO. Therefore, it is not necessarily the case that a higher TSL predicts a greater
likelihood of being acquired as TSL is related to either huge success or failure at the patent level.
Additionally, [Wang, 2015] finds that large firms acquire startups from a similar technological field,
and there are entrepreneurs who match their innovation to potential acquirers.
Column (3) in the table shows that only the equity funding ratio matters for exit through
acquisition. TSL has no statistical power to predict the probability of being acquired. Startups
with a lower proportion of equity funding are actually less likely to be acquired and more likely to
stay as usual for a prolonged period. Column (4) shows that firms with many investors are more
likely to acquire other startups than to stay as usual. TSL has no effect on the made-acquisition
exit scenario. Column (1) shows no significant association between TSL and a higher propensity of
unsuccessful exits. This could be because startups with more than one issued patent are already
top-tier firms in the startup world. Therefore, it is less likely to see them unsuccessfully exit. They
either go public or are acquired.
Table 1.4 shows how investment costs are related to TSL. The results in this table resemble con-
temporaneous correlation rather than a causal relationship. As mentioned in the previous sections,
I assume the total funding amount as the total costs of researching and developing the technology.
Consistent with the prediction, higher TSL is associated with a larger funding amount (costs). If
TSL increases by 1 from -0.5 to 0.5, it increases total cost by $0.3 million. Although other variables,
such as the number of investors or location, have far more significance statistically and economically
than TSL, it is still meaningful to provide evidence that achieving high TSL is costly.
Together with Table 1.3, high TSL requires more investment but has a high chance of the firm
successfully exiting via IPO. Therefore, achieving and maintaining a higher level of TSL can be
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Table 1.3: Multinomial Logit Regression: Startup Exits and TSL
The dependent variable is a categorical variable. The default scenario is to operate a company as usual as
a startup in the market. "IPO" represents the exit of a startup by going public, "Was Acquired" represents
the exist of a startup by being acquired by another public or private firms, "Made Acquisitions" represents
a startup that expands its business area by acquiring other startups or firms, and "Closed" represents a
startup that exits the market permanently. This multinomial logit regression shows the relative likelihood
of each scenario compared to the base case. The number of investors is the total number of individual and
institutional investors of a startup. The total funding over total equity funding ratio shows the extent to
which a startup depends on equity financing. California is a dummy variable for startups headquartered in
California. The total funding amount(Rank) is a ranking variable based on the total funding amount until
2016. The detailed empirical methodology is explained in Section 1.3.2.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Closed IPO Was Acquired Made Acquisitions
TSL 0.002 0.010*** 0.002 0.004
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Number of Investors -0.059 -0.073** -0.003 0.084***
(0.076) (0.036) (0.022) (0.020)
Total Funding/Total Equity Funding 0.426 0.234 -2.183** -0.246
(0.400) (0.517) (1.045) (0.796)
California -0.131 -0.360 0.227 0.247
(0.572) (0.295) (0.212) (0.277)
Total Funding Amount (Rank) 1.40e-04 0.002*** 7.96e-05 0.001***
(2.60e-04) (2.87e-04) (9.84e-05) (2.53e-04)
Constant -4.469*** -9.125*** 0.211 -7.918***
(1.227) (1.438) (1.137) (1.456)
Observations 856 856 856 856
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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either more profitable if everything goes well or can increase costs if operations do not proceed as
expected compared to the case with a lower level of TSL. This result is consistent with patent-level
evidence that TSL is associated with extreme outcomes, either huge success or huge failure.
Table 1.4: OLS Regression: Startup Investment Costs and TSL
The dependent variable is the total funding amount raised between 2010 and 2016. The number of investors
is the number of investors involved in funding. California is an indicator variable that shows if a startup is
located in California. The detailed empirical methodology is explained in Section 1.3.2.
(1)
VARIABLES Total Funding Amount ($Mil)
TSL 0.310**
(0.141)








Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1.5.3 Evidence from public firms
Table 1.5 shows the summary statistics of firms grouped by TSL. Firms are divided into three
groups for TSL each year. The Low group has negative TSL, which means that they are engaged in
more within-class innovations. On the other hand, The High group has positive TSL, which means
that they are engaged in more outside-the-box-type innovations or are combining prior arts in an
unique way that has not been tried by others. The Med group can be considered as a firm that is
developing technologies close to the standard, which is class-level average. The Med group includes
many of the big firms holding many patents. The average firm size by total assets for the Med
group is $8.2 billion, whereas the Low group has an average of $2.6 billion in assets, and the High
group has total assets of approximately $2 billion. The Med group has 74 patents on average while
the Low and High group have approximately nine patents. However, the relative forward citations
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level has different implications. The High TSL tercile has the highest relative forward citations and
the relationship is linear. Thus, patents with higher TSL seem to have greater technological impact
than the other two groups after removing the technological class-level mean effect. Additionally,
the High group expenses slightly more on R&D by 1 to 2 percentage points compared to their total
assets. This is possible evidence that higher TSL implies high cost – a high technological return
relationship. However, on average, the High group has the lowest profitability by ROA and gross
profitability. Thus, it is not clear from the summary statistics if there is any linear relationship
between TSL and operational success. Additionally, both the High group and Low group have a
slightly higher market-to-book ratio than the Med group. The High group even has a slightly higher
market-to-book ratio than the Low group. This could be a confounding effect of firm size, but we
cannot rule out that high TSL is associated with growth options after controlling for the size effect.
In terms of asset tangibility, the High group also has less tangible assets. Interestingly, the High
group has fewer intangible assets than the other two groups while they spend more on R&D. This
implies that the High group conducts more internal development than simply buying technologies
from external firms. Based on the summary statistics result, the only notable difference between
the High TSL group and the Low TSL group stems from different levels of TSL. Therefore, any
pattern documented later in this paper could be plausibly considered as consequences of different
TSL.
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Table 1.5: Summary Statistics
The sample period is from 1976 to 2010. A patent’s TSL measures the average technological distance between an originating patent’s class and the
classes of cited patents. It is adjusted to be centered around the class’s average distance. A firm’s TSL is the average of the patent-level measure
across all issued patents in a given year. It is between -1 (within-class innovation) and 1 (outside-the-box innovation). The average economic value
of a patent is from Kogan et al. (2017), which is based on the three-day abnormal return around the patent issue date. The average forward citations
measure how many times an originating patent receives forward citations from other patents compared to its technological class mean of forward
citations. All the book values are based on fiscal-year-end values. Market cap is measured as share price times the number of shares outstanding.
The book value of equity is defined as shareholder equity(SEQ) plus deferred taxes(TXDITC, if available), minus preferred stock(PSTK ). If SEQ
is not available, I use common equity(CEQ) plus preferred equity(PSTK ) or assets(AT ) minus liabilities(LT ). If PSTK is not available, I use
redemption value(PSTKRV ) or liquidation value(PSTKL). Market value of equity for market-to-book ratio is measured at the end of the fiscal year
(month t). Intangible capital is measured by total intangible assets(INTAN ) minus intangible amortization(AM ). R&D expenses(XRD). ROA is
measured by net income (NI) divided by total assets(AT ). ROE is NI divided by common equity. The definitions of gross profit and operating
leverage follow [NovyMarx, 2013], [Novy-Marx, 2011] each. Book values are winsorized at 1%.
High Med Low
VARIABLES MEAN SD MEAN SD MEAN SD
TSL 0.212 0.134 0.005 0.035 -0.185 0.105
Total Assets 1996.749 9685.035 8153.777 30817.300 2630.356 14182.270
Size 2095.740 9945.675 7901.860 26591.600 2917.589 14568.000
ME/BE 2.825 5.971 2.710 5.199 2.814 5.689
ROA -0.076 0.422 -0.020 0.327 -0.054 0.410
ROE -0.090 0.720 -0.044 0.794 -0.087 0.979
Gross Profits / Total Assets 0.343 0.316 0.352 0.272 0.357 0.302
Leverage 0.617 0.476 0.665 0.400 0.627 0.485
Operating Leverage 1.065 0.587 0.983 0.494 1.069 0.626
Sales & General Expense / Total Assets 0.349 0.298 0.292 0.233 0.338 0.328
Cost of Goods Sold / Total Assets 0.714 0.522 0.688 0.449 0.725 0.532
R&D expense / Total Assets 0.091 0.150 0.078 0.123 0.083 0.138
Property, Plant, and Equipment / Total Assets 0.251 0.177 0.270 0.174 0.253 0.178
CAPEX / Total Assets 0.059 0.055 0.061 0.049 0.059 0.053
R&D expense / PPENT 1.222 3.726 0.946 3.278 1.189 4.011
Intangible Assets / Total Assets 0.089 0.138 0.094 0.136 0.092 0.141
Average Forward Citations (Relative to Tech Class Mean) 152% 128% 126%
Number of Patents 8.8316 74.6155 8.8364
Number of Firmyears 14,029 13,725 13,536
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To understand the basic characteristics of TSL at the firm level, I choose Immersion Corp
as an example firm. Figure 1.2 shows a TSL time series of Immersion Corp. The company was
founded by Louis Rosenberg in 1993 and has been developing touch feedback technology, also
known as haptic technology, used in many devices such as smartphones and gaming tools. Haptic or
kinesthetic communication recreates the sense of touch by applying forces, vibrations, or motions to
the user12. Therefore, to develop haptic technology for electronics in a broad sense, knowledge from
different fields such as neuroscience, and psychology is required. Immersion Corp is a licensor of this
technology. The firm is in the top tercile portfolio based on TSL. In its first public year following
its IPO in 1999, the company had high TSL. Their technology was mainly used in gaming devices.
In the following year, the TSL decreased slightly but started to increase again from year 2002
and peaked in 2007 when the first iPhone was released and many other smartphone manufacturers
followed. In this example, a high TSL represents one of the biggest innovations in the last decade.
Then, in 2013, the companies TSL decreased to a record low as the smartphone market matured.
Here, I compare the time series pattern of the TSL with that of the relative forward citations to
see if TSL is related to technological impact and applicability. The relative forward citation is
computed by dividing the number of forward citations of an originating patent by the total number
of forward citations of all patents in the originating patent’s class. Then, I take the average across
all patents in a given year. In this way, I remove the technological class-level fixed effect. As in
Figure 1.2, relative forward citations closely follow the time series pattern of TSL. For example,
patents issued in the year 2007 receive the highest relative forward citations until year 2015. Patents
with higher TSL obtain relatively more forward citations than the patents with lower TSL. Thus,
a higher TSL implies a greater technological impact if forward citation is considered a good proxy
for technological impact. Moreover, TSL is persistent for a firm in the top tercile portfolio such as
Imersion Corp, which weakly implies that TSL might be related to some systematic risk factor.
Table 1.6 shows the results from panel regression of 60-month excess return volatility on TSL
and other controls. As stated in section 1.3, volatility is a simple risk measure widely used in
practice. If the riskiness of a novel R&D strategy with high TSL has an effect on equity risk, it is
plausible that TSL predicts return volatility positively. Column (1) in the table shows that TSL


















































Figure 1.2: High TSL example: Immersion Corporation
Figure 1.2 shows the time series TSL and relative forward citations of Immersion Corpora-
tion(NASDAQ:IMMR). Immersion Corporation was founded by Louis Rosenberg and has been developing
touch feedback technology, also known as haptic technology which is used in many devices such as smart
phones. This firm is in the top decile in terms of TSL of all sample firms.
predicts 60-month excess return volatility positively. If a firm’s TSL increases by 1, its 60-month
volatility increases by 2 percent. Similarly, TSL also predicts systematic volatility positively. A
one-unit increase in TSL leads to a 3.67 percent increase in the 60-month systematic volatility. TSL
also positively predicts an increase in ROA volatility. Firms with highly novel technologies will
experience more volatile profitability in the future. Interestingly, TSL has no significant association
with idiosyncratic volatility. All the regressions include year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered by firm to remove further time-series correlations in error within a firm. Although the
economic impact of TSL on 60-month excess return volatility is not strong, the results in Table 1.6
imply that higher TSL could be associated with higher equity risk for a firm, particularly systematic
risk. Although not reported here, TSL helps explain heterogeneous systematic volatility in the cross-
section. Therefore, it is reasonable to state that TSL is associated with equity risk dynamically as
well as cross-sectionally.
Table 1.7 first confirms that TSL has predictability in the cross-section of stock returns. The
Fama–MacBeth cross-sectional regression results show that TSL positively predicts excess stock
returns. With basic control variables such as size and market-to-book ratio, the relationship between
TSL and stock return is only significant at the 10% level. However the significance level increases
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Table 1.6: Volatility Panel Regression
This table shows whether TSL predicts 60-month excess return volatility, idiosyncratic volatility, and ROA
volatility. The sample period is from 1976 to 2010. Sixty-month excess return volatility is a forward-
looking variable that is simply the log of the standard deviation of monthly returns within 60 months from
the base year. Sixty-month idiosyncratic volatility is also a forward-looking variable, which is based on the
Carhart 4-factor model and log values. Similarly, systematic volatility is defined as the standard deviation of
predicted returns according to the 4-factor model, and it is in log values. For ROA volatility, I use the five-year
standard deviation because of limited data frequency. A firm’s TSL is the average of the patent-level measure
across all issued patents in a given year. It is between -1 (within-class innovation) and 1 (outside-the-box
innovation).. A firm’s TSL is the average of the patent-level measure across all issued patents in a given year.
It is between -1 (within-class innovation) and 1 (outside-the-box innovation). All the book values are based
on fiscal year-end values. Size is measured using share price and the number of shares outstanding. The
book value of equity is defined as shareholder equity (SEQ) plus deferred taxes(TXDITC, if available), minus
preferred stock(PSTK ). If SEQ is not available, I use common equity(CEQ) plus preferred equity(PSTK ) or
assets(AT ) minus liabilities(LT ). If PSTK is not available, I use redemption value(PSTKRV ) or liquidation
value(PSTKL). Market value of equity for book-to-market ratio is measured at the end of the fiscal year
and in natural log values. ROA is defined as profit (OIBDP) over total assets (AT). Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level. The detailed empirical methodology is explained in Section 1.3.3.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Total Vol. Idio Vol. Sys Vol. ROA Vol.
TSL 0.020* -0.049 0.036** 0.008*
(0.011) (0.138) (0.018) (0.004)
Size -0.051*** -0.045 -0.0400*** -0.001
(0.011) (0.046) (0.013) (0.002)
BE / ME -0.056*** 0.095 -0.059*** 0.002
(0.015) (0.078) (0.017) (0.004)
Leverage 0.127*** 0.861*** -0.040 0.024
(0.043) (0.270) (0.064) (0.014)
ROA -0.161*** 1.186*** -0.194***
(0.039) (0.308) (0.048)
R&D / AT 0.040 0.280 0.033 0.131**
(0.053) (0.573) (0.077) (0.053)
Intangibles / AT -0.023 -1.602*** 0.057 0.077***
(0.056) (0.314) (0.091) (0.026)
Constant 3.936*** 3.403*** 3.338*** 0.084***
(0.056) (0.263) (0.072) (0.014)
Observations 33,044 32,972 32,972 29,991
Adjusted R-squared 0.735 0.111 0.503 0.696
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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with the inclusion of more proper control variables related to innovation and a firm’s fundamental
characteristics. A one-unit increase in TSL increases, from -0.5 to 0.5, is related to higher excess
returns of from 3.18 percentage points to 5.1 percentage points (annualized).
Is TSL explained by conventional factors? To answer this question, I conduct a sorting analysis.
Table 1.8 shows whether the abnormal return difference between a high TSL portfolio and a low
TSL portfolio is statistically different from zero. The return of the zero-cost TSL portfolio is not
explained by conventional 4-factors. The zero-cost TSL portfolio has an abnormal return of 2.532
percent (annualized) with equal-weighting and 3.12 percent (annualized) with value-weighting. This
implies that TSL is not explained by conventional 4-factors and should be associated with different
types of risk sources.
1.5.4 The channel
A channel I find is that a high TSL R&D strategy can affect systematic risk and stock returns
in a direct channel through covariance between the stock returns and aggregate knowledge capital
productivity. As seen in the previous sections, high TSL patents are more likely to have more
significant technological impact ex-post. Therefore, they are more likely to be used by many other
patents in the future. For example, [Trajtenberg et al., 1997] shows that patents with high techno-
logical distance have greater applicability in a sense that those patents are more likely to be used
by technologies in a variety of fields. When the economy is strong, there will be a greater number
of inventors and firms developing their technologies or products based on high TSL patents. On
the other hand, when an economy is in recession, a significant population of the inventors and
firms exit the economy. Therefore, high TSL patents are used less. Given these findings, high TSL
technologies are likely to have pro-cyclical productivity. Thus, firms with high TSL technologies
could be more subject to aggregate economic risk than firms with low TSL technologies.
Consistent with the above reasoning, I find patent-level evidence that patents with high TSL
obtain more forward citations when aggregate-level innovation is more active. This shows that
TSL could be a proxy for exposure to aggregate level innovations. Table 1.9 shows whether TSL
is positively associated with exposure to aggregate-level innovation activities at the patent level.
As shown in the Table 1.9, TSL positively predicts a higher level of covariance between individual
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Table 1.7: Cross-Sectional Regression
This table shows the cross-sectional regression results using monthly returns. All returns are excess returns,
and the unit is percent . The sample period is from 1976 to 2010. A firm’s TSL is the average TSL
across all issued patents in a given year. It is between -1 (within-class innovation) and 1 (outside-the-box
innovation). All the book values are based on fiscal year-end values. Book values at the end of the fiscal
year t are matched with monthly stock returns in year (t + 1). Size is measured using share price and
the number of shares outstanding. The book value of equity is defined as shareholder equity(SEQ),plus
deferred taxes(TXDITC, if available) minus preferred stock(PSTK ). If SEQ is not available, I use common
equity(CEQ) plus preferred equity(PSTK ) or assets(AT ) minus liabilities(LT ). If PSTK is not available, I
use redemption value(PSTKRV ) or liquidation value(PSTKL). Market value of equity for market-to-book
ratio is measured at the end of the fiscal year. R&D expenses(XRD) are used as a proxy for intangible
investment and are normalized by total assets. I exclude no R&D expense firm years from the sample.
Industry fixed effect is controlled by dummy variables based on the three-digit sic code.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Excess Return Excess Return Excess Return Excess Return
TSL 0.265* 0.369** 0.425** 0.366**
(0.160) (0.179) (0.187) (0.179)
Knowledge Capital / AT 0.706** 0.592** 0.699**
(0.288) (0.271) (0.289)










R&D /AT 3.290** 1.577 3.222**
(1.278) (1.165) (1.289)
Leverage 0.921*** 0.195 0.845***
(0.278) (0.242) (0.275)
ROA 3.233*** 2.081*** 3.289***
(0.431) (0.458) (0.434)
Size -0.124** -0.177*** -0.164***
(0.0507) (0.0433) (0.0453)
BE / ME 0.467*** 0.586*** 0.599***
(0.0788) (0.0846) (0.0855)




Constant 1.193 2.721* -0.767 2.826*
(0.966) (1.510) (1.038) (1.458)
No. of Firms 4,627 3,549 3,441 3,548
R-squared 0.201 0.217 0.219 0.219
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.8: Sorting Analysis: TSL Sorted Portfolios
This table contains the time series regression of TSLsorted portfolio returns. The sample period is from
1976 to 2010. A firm’s TSL is the average of the patent-level measure across all issued patents in a given
year. It is between -1 (within-class innovation) and 1 (outside-the-box innovation). Other factor variables
are obtained from Kenneth French’s website.
Variable Low (1) (2) (3) High H-L
Panel A: Equal-weighted portfolios
α 0.238** 0.331 0.369*** 0.339*** 0.448*** 0.211**
(0.096) (0.094) (0.084) (0.098) (0.109) (0.095)
MKTRF 1.062*** 1.084*** 1.080*** 1.111*** 1.052*** -0.010
(0.022) (0.021) (0.019) (0.022) (0.025) (0.022)
HML -0.050 -0.012 -0.028 -0.017 -0.103*** -0.053
(0.034) (0.034) (0.030) (0.035) (0.039) (0.034)
SMB 0.934*** 0.820*** 0.615*** 0.824*** 1.019 0.085***
(0.032) (0.031) (0.027) (0.032) (0.036) (0.031)
UMD -0.170*** -0.220*** -0.220** -0.228*** -0.244*** -0.074***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.021) (0.024) (0.021)
R-squared 0.918 0.918 0.927 0.916 0.904 0.0415
Panel B: Value-weighted portfolios
α 0.787*** 0.715*** 0.692*** 0.740*** 1.047 0.260*
(0.111) (0.102) (0.076) (0.094) (0.122) (0.158)
MKTRF 0.924*** 0.997*** 0.962*** 0.956*** 0.992 0.068*
(0.025) (0.023) (0.017) (0.021) (0.028) (0.036)
HML -0.177*** -0.159*** -0.178*** -0.072*** -0.220*** -0.042
(0.040) (0.036) (0.027) (0.033) (0.044) (0.056)
SMB 0.231*** -0.177*** -0.161*** 0.095*** 0.130*** -0.101*
(0.037) (0.033) (0.025) (0.031) (0.040) (0.052)
UMD 0.085*** 0.026 -0.039*** -0.090** -0.030 -0.115***
(0.024) (0.022) (0.017) (0.020) (0.027) (0.034)
R-squared 0.819 0.840 0.901 0.860 0.807 0.0386
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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patent productivity and aggregate-level productivity. Even after controlling for some alternative
measures regarding the qualitative characteristics of innovation, TSL still maintains a positive
and significant relation with βfcites. Altogether, high TSL patents become more technologically
useful (productive) when overall innovation activity measured by the amount of forward citations
is high. This finding could be expanded to the firm-level relationship between TSL and aggregate
productivity of knowledge capital. Firms with high TSL are more subject to exogenous shock to
the aggregate productivity of knowledge capital, and they have higher stock returns because of this
co-movement.
Table 1.10 shows the correlation coefficient between aggregate consumption shock and knowledge
capital productivity shock. There is a correlation coefficient of 0.309, which is statistically signif-
icantly different from zero. This positive correlation implies that knowledge capital productivity
could also be pro-cyclical.
If the high TSL of a firm proxies for sensitivity to the knowledge capital productivity risk
as we see from patent-level evidence in Table 1.9, the firm should have higher stock returns as a
consequence of pro-cyclicality of knowledge capital productivity. However, this should be interpreted
carefully because there could have an accumulation of non-negligible estimation errors in each stage.
Additionally, this is an indirect way of showing if a risk factor carries a positive price of risk.
To resolve this concern, Table 1.11 adds more direct evidence that knowledge capital productivity
carries a positive price of risk. I use 130 test assets including 25 size-BM portfolios, 25 BM-
investment portfolios, 25 size-investment portfolios, 25 size-profitability portfolios, 25 profitability-
investment portfolios, and 5 TSL portfolios. I first estimate betas by running time-series regression
and then running cross-sectional regression to determine if the slope coefficient of the knowledge
capital productivity shock is positive and significant. Consistent with the results in Table 1.10, the
slope coefficient for the knowledge capital productivity shock is positive and statistically significant.
Although the magnitude should be interpreted carefully due to possible measurement errors, the
estimated price of risk for knowledge productivity shock is 0.636 percent per month (7.632 percent
annualized), which is economically significant. This directly implies that firms positively exposed
to knowledge capital productivity shock should have higher stock returns. Also, together with the
finding in Table 1.10 that the knowledge capital productivity shock has positive correlation at 11.6
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Table 1.9: Systematic Risk: Patent-level Evidence
This table contains the regression of patent citations beta (βfcites) on TSL and other control variables. The
sample period is from 1976 to 2014. TSL measures the average technological distance between an originating
patent’s class and the class of cited patents. A firm’s TSL is the average of the patent-level measure across
all issued patents in a given year. It is between -1 (within-the-class innovation) and 1 (outside-the-class
innovation). Economic value is estimated from the stock market reaction to patent issuance as in [Kogan
et al., 2017], and the data is obtained from Noah Stoffman’s website. The number of backward citations
is the total number of backward references of an originating patent. The number of self-citations is the
number of backward citations made by the same assignee. The number of external citations is the number
of backward citations made by examiners. The Trajtenberg distance measures a similar quality as TSL, but
it uses the simplified distance between the originating patent’s class and its backward citations([Trajtenberg
et al., 1997]). Please see section 1.7 for a detailed explanation. The generality score is the number of different
technological classes of the patents citing the originating patent. Innovative Originality at the patent level
is the number of unique technological classes of patents referred to by an originating patent up to secondary





Economic value 3.94e-04*** 1.89e-04***
(1.16e-04) (5.80e-05)
No. Backward Citations 0.001*** 0.001***
(1.62e-04) (1.56e-04)
No. Self Citations -0.027*** -0.003
(0.009) (0.004)












Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.10: Knowledge Capital Productivity Shock Correlation
This table shows the correlation coefficients of knowledge capital productivity shock with aggregate con-
sumption shock and zero-cost TSL portfolio returns. Knowledge capital productivity (or factor share) is
obtained from year-by-year cross-sectional productivity regression. Firm level output is measured by net
sales (SALE) deflated in 2009 dollars. Input factors are physical capital, knowledge capital, other intangible
capital, and labor. Since compustat Labor(EMP) is the total number of employees, I divide output and
inputs by the number of employees and run per-capita productivity regression. Firm level intangible capital
is obtained from [Peters and Taylor, 2016]. For physical capital stock, I use COMPUSTAT PPEGT. The
detailed empirical methodology is explained in Section 1.3.4.
Knowledge capital productivity shock
Consumption shock 0.309**
(0.0116)
High TSL minus Low TSL 0.116**
(0.0170 )
P values in parentheses
percent with the returns of High-minus-Low-TSL portfolio, it is reasonable to conjecture that the
TSL’s explanatory power will be partially subsumed by this knowledge capital productivity risk
variable.
Table 1.12 repeats the Fama–MacBeth regression in Table 1.7 adding the knowledge capital
productivity beta(βknow). If the primary source of the return difference between high TSL stocks
and low TSL stocks is co-movement with aggregate knowledge capital productivity, adding βknow
in the Fama–MacBeth regression should reduce the statistical power of TSL dramatically because
βknow is a direct measure of co-movement between a stock return and aggregate knowledge capital
productivity. As in Table 1.12, when including βknow in the Fama–MacBeth regression, the coeffi-
cient of TSL decreases from 0.369 to 0.298 (by 19 percent), and so does its statistical power. On
the other hand, the βknow is statistically significant at 10 percent level, and the marginal effect of
it is around 0.84 percent annualized. So it seems that the part of TSL’s explnatory power which is
correlated with knowledge capital productivity risk is subsumed by the βknow.
In addition, Figure 1.3 shows that TSL portfolios are aligned closely to the 45 degree line, which
implies knowledge capital productivity risk helps explain returns of TSL portfolios. Compared to
the graph in the left of Figure 1.3, the right panel, which use four factors plus knowledge capital
factor, clearly fits test assets better. Especially, the fitness of TSL portfolios are highly improved
than the four factor model. This also supports that knowledge capital productivity risk explains
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Table 1.11: Fama–MacBeth Regression
This table contains the cross-sectional regression of test assets on beta to knowledge capital productivity
shock and other conventional betas. The sample period is from 1976 to 2010. βknow is measured by regressing
excess returns on knowledge capital productivity shock. For the definition of knowledge capital productivity

















Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.12: Fama–MacBeth Regression
This table contains the Fama–MacBeth regression of individual stock returns on TSL and other control
variables. The sample period is from 1976 to 2010. βknow is measured by regressing excess returns on
knowledge capital productivity shock. For the definition of knowledge capital productivity shock, please see
Table 1.10. For the definitions of other control variables, please refer to Table 1.7. This column corresponds







Knowledge Capital / AT 0.610**
(0.300)

















Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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the difference between stock returns of High TSL and Low TSL portfolios. Although not reported,
the difference between βknow of highest quintile TSL portfolio (0.133) and βknow of lowest quintile
TSL portfolio (-0.048) is 0.18, and it implies around 1.65 percent of returns when multiplied by
the estimated price of risk in Table 1.11. This is about 65 percent of the abnormal return of equal
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Figure 1.3: Fitted Returns versus Average Portfolio Returns
Figure 1.3 shows average returns of test asset portfolios versus fitted returns of the portfolios. (A) The
conventional 4 factors and knowledge capital productivity factor in 1.11 are used to fit the average portfolio
returns.(B) The conventional 4 factors are used to fit the average portfolio returns. L denotes lowest TSL
portfolio and H denotes highest TSL portfolio. Orange bubbles (empty circles) represent test asset portfolios
other than TSL portfolios. TSL portfolios are represented by blue dots (filled circles). Gray straight line is
45 degree line.
1.5.5 Alternative Explanations
The evidence in the previous sections implies that TSL could be associated with systematic risk
rather than idiosyncratic risk. Also, I show that knowledge capital productivity risk could be a
source of systematic risk with various supporting evidence. However, I still should not rule out
other possible explanations for the findings.
As briefly mentioned in the introduction, one possible explanation is the theory suggested in
[Berk et al., 2004]. I first find that TSL is positively associated with extreme outcomes, which
means it is a proxy for technological risk (Table 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4). Because patent issuance is
one of the stages in an R&D project, the technological risk proxied by TSL representing an ex-ante
characteristic of issued patents is related to failure risk in the development stage. According to
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[Berk et al., 2004], this type of failure risk can indirectly affect the risk premium of a firm, which is
a collection of multistage R&D projects, by increasing the threshold for the option to invest in the
next stage of the project. Consistent with the theory’s prediction, I find that high TSL is associated
with high stock returns and systematic volatility. Therefore, pursuing novel R&D strategy indirectly
increases stock returns.
Alternatively, the positive association between TSL and systematic risk could stem from financial
constraint risk. High TSL projects may be hard to finance with debt because they require massive
investments due to the technological difficulty, so firms with high TSL are likely to be more subject
to financial constraint risk. According to [Whited and Wu, 2006], the stock returns of financially
constrained firms move together and earn higher returns. For example, in Table 1.4, high TSL is
positively related to high funding amount, which implies that high TSL projects are expensive in
the first place. Also, this could be a reason why the startups with high TSL do more IPOs (Table
1.3) in terms of that they have to go to public equity market to raise funds because they are no
longer able to finance more with debt financing.
Another possible explanation is a behavioral explanation. Similar to [Hirshleifer et al., 2018],
high TSL projects could be more difficult to evaluate. By its definition, to draw new knowledge
from previous knowledge in the very different field is probably something that has not been tried
many times in the past. Therefore investors might lack enough information to assess the values of
high TSL projects. In this case, stocks with high TSL could be discounted and have higher stock
returns. However, as in Table 1.1, TSL does predict the higher probability of winning innovation
awards, which implies the existence of people who can assess the fair value of high TSL projects
in the market. It could be contradicting evidence to the valuation uncertainty hypothesis at least
with the sample firms in this study.
1.6 Robustness
1.6.1 Correlation with other measures
Table 1.14 repeats the R&D100 awards regression in Table 1.1 replacing TSL with alternative
measures such as Trajtenberg distance and Innovative Originality. [Trajtenberg et al., 1997] suggests
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a backward-looking measure that shows if a patent combines remote technological areas. If the
originating patent has the same three-digit technological class with a backward-cited patent, the
weight is 0. If the originating patent has the same two-digit technological class but a different three-
digit class with a backward citation, 0.33 of the weight is given. If the first digit of the originating
patent’s class and the first digit of the referred patent’s class are the same, the weight is 0.66. If
the first digit of the originating patent’s class and the first digit of the referred patent’s class are
different, the weight is 1. Another alternative measure is Innovative Originality, which is the total
number of unique technological classes up to secondary classes.
In Table 1.13, TSL has a correlation coefficient of 0.706 with the technological distance computed
as in [Trajtenberg et al., 1997]. This shows that both capture similar qualitative aspects but they
are still differentiated. This is because TSL uses a more accurate way of measuring technological
distance by using the historical citations network rather than simply and arbitrarily assigning dis-
tances based on similarity in classification codes. The second row shows how much TSL is correlated
with the originality measure. As [Trajtenberg et al., 1997] distinguishes originality and technologi-
cal distance, TSL is also distinguishable from Innovative Originality suggested by [Hirshleifer et al.,
2018] because they have only 0.232 of the correlation coefficient. The originality measures how many
various ingredients are used while TSL measures how different the ingredients are from those that
are newly created. Therefore, TSL measures the different dimensions of technology not captured
by Trajtenberg distance or Innovative Originality.
Table 1.13: Correlation Table
This is a correlation table of TSL and other patent characteristics, technological distance in [Trajtenberg




Table 1.14 shows whether these two alternative measures capture what TSL proxies, which is
technological breakthrough. In panel(1) of Table 1.14, patent-level Innovative Originality does not
show statistical predictive power for the likelihood of earning an R&D 100 award. In panel(2), the
Trajtenberg distance predicts award-winning probability, but the statistical power is not as strong
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as that of TSL. These results imply that TSL could be a better proxy for technological breakthrough
than the alternative measures.
Table 1.14: Alternative Measures of TSL: Breakthrough Regression
This table repeats the R&D100 awards regression in Table 1.1 replacing TSL with alternative measures
such as the Trajtenberg distance and Innovative Originality. The sample period is from 1976 to 2014. The
Trajtenberg distance measures similar qualities as TSL but with a simpler weighting scheme. Innovative
Originality at the patent level is the total number of unique technological classes of all backward citations
of the originating patent up to secondary classes.
(1) (2)





Num. of Backward Citations 5.77e-04 9.93e-04***
(9.42e-04) (3.75e-04)
Self Citations 0.164 0.169
(0.113) (0.112)





Year FE, class cluster Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.15 shows cross-sectional regression results when including ohter major innovation related
variables such as Innovative Efficiency and Innovative Originality. Innovative Efficiency measures
a quantitative characteristic of innovation by total number of output patents. As described above,
Innovative Originality measures a qualitative characteristic of innovation which focuses on how
broad the ingredient technology fields are. As shown in Table 1.15, even after controlling for other
innovation characteristic, TSL still can positively predict stock returns at 10 percent significance
level. This evidence supports that TSL is distinguished from (1) other quantitative characteristic
and (2) other qualitative characteristic.
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Table 1.15: Alternative Measures of TSL: Fama-Macbeth Regression
This table repeats the Fama-Macbeth Cross-Sectional regression adding other innovation related variables
such as Innovative Originality and Innovative Efficiency([Hirshleifer et al., 2013, Hirshleifer et al., 2018]).
The sample period is from 1976 to 2014. Innovative Originality at the patent level is the total number
of unique technological classes of all backward citations of the originating patent up to secondary classes.










Knowledge Capital/ AT 0.665**
(0.300)
R&D / AT 3.820***
(1.297)
















Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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1.7 Conclusions
Despite a long history of literature discovering the relationship between innovation and the cross-
section of stock returns, there are few academic works that focus on how the qualitative aspects of
innovation affect firm risk and stock returns. This paper contributes to the literature by shedding
light on a qualitative characteristic of innovation represented by technological distance. Addition-
ally, I add evidence that the new pattern could be related to systematic risk.
First, this paper contributes to the innovation literature by suggesting a new novelty measure
of innovation, which shows the extent to which a new patented technology is built upon extremely
different prior technologies and discovers its association with more risky outcomes. I provide patent
and startup-level evidence using novel data obtained from Crunchbase.
Second, this paper contributes to the asset pricing literature by (1) showing a new cross-sectional
pattern related to an ex-ante qualitative characteristic of innovation and (2) providing evidence that
the pattern is related to systematic risk.
For firm level analyses, I find that higher TSL is associated with higher stock returns in the
cross-section. I also show that high TSL is positively related to high future return volatility (total
and systematic) but find no relationship with idiosyncratic volatility. This implies the possibility
that TSL is priced in the cross-section of stock returns and subject to some type of systematic risk
source. At least, the finding supports meaningful association between TSL and systematic equity
risk.
Next, I find evidence that high TSL patents are more productive when the aggregate innova-
tion level is high. In addition, knowledge capital productivity risk has a positive slope coefficient
in the cross-sectional regression with various tested asset portfolios. Finally, when the firm-level
beta to knowledge capital productivity shock is included in the Fama–MacBeth regression, TSL’s
explanatory power becomes weak, which means the effect of TSL is subsumed by knowledge capital
productivity risk.
The empirical evidence supports a channel that explains positive association between TSL and
systematic equity risk. Firms with high TSL can have high co-movement with aggregate innovation
productivity because novel innovation with high TSL is related to significant technological impact in
the sense that it is referred to by more post-technologies. Coupled with the finding that innovation
48
productivity risk has a positive price of risk, firms with high TSL should have higher stock returns
because of positive covariance with aggregate innovation productivity.
Alternatively the evidence also supports that the failure risk associated with novel R&D strategy
can indirectly change the risk premium([Berk et al., 2004]). The finding that high TSL is associated
with a higher likelihood of patent failure and high stock returns supports this theory. Also this
paper still has a room to explore in terms of distinguishing between the knowledge productivity risk
channel and the alternative channels briefly discussed in the Section 1.5.5.
Overall, my results show a possibility that a qualitative dimension of innovation, the techno-
logical distance (TSL), is aggregated at firm-level and priced in the cross-section of stock returns
through systematic risk related to knowledge capital productivity.
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Chapter 2
Intangibles and Equity Risk Collateral
Channel
2.1 Introduction
The role of intangible capital and investments has been increased in the economy. [Corrado and
Hulten, 2014] documents that the investments in intangible capital started to exceed the invest-
ments in tangible capital. In response to these economic changes, we observe more cases that
intangible capital is used as collateral for corporate loans. The history of public firms’ intangible
collateral usage only goes back to mid 90’s, thus it can be considered as fairly recent and new phe-
nomenon. Although the finance and economics studies have mostly assumed that intangible capital
is non-pledgeable portion of a firm’s assets, there are some recent studies trying to incorporate the
intangible capital in the model or find empirical evidence shedding light on the important role of
intangible capital and investments .([Li et al., 2014],[Peters and Taylor, 2016], [Ai et al., 2012], [Belo
et al., 2014])
Also there are several studies focusing on the cases that specific intangible assets used as collat-
eral. For example, [Mann, 2018] studies the patent collateral of US public firms and add empirical
evidence that it increases debt financing. [Lumioti, 2012] also investigate how the usage of intangible
collateral is related to credit risk using Dealscan data.
However, not yet many studies have focused on how the usage of intangible collateral is related
to equity returns and firm risks. Recently, one possible mechanism of how the type of collateral
affects stock returns and firm risk that has been studied by [Ai et al., 2018]. They show that a firm’s
asset composition matters for its expected stock return because collateralizability of the assets can
provide insurance to economic downturn and reduce covariance of equity returns and business cycle.
They first suggest a production economy model that allows two different types of assets based on
collateralizability. Their model predicts that the firms with more collateralizable assets have lower
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stock returns than the other firms with less collateralizable assets. When a negative aggregate
shock arrives, the return on pledgeable capital is less responsive to the shock than the return
on non-pledgeable (intangible) capital, because pledgeable capital can relax financial constraint
which binds more in this situation. From the model, they develop an empirical measure for asset
collateralizability assuming that intangible assets are not be able used as collateral. They find
empirical evidence consistent with their model that firms with high collateralizability have lower
stock returns than the other firms with lower collateralizability. What they argue is that insurance
channel dominates the leverage effect of highly collateralizable assets.
Although this collateralizability premium sounds interesting and plausible to explain the higher
stock returns for firms with higher level of intangible capital (low collateralizability), one can easily
find empirical evidence that their assumption that intangible assets are not pledgeable can be
falsified. There are cases that the intangibles are pledged as mentioned at the beginning of this
paper. Also [Mann, 2018] finds that about 38 percent of US patenting firms had pledged patents
by 2013. Therefore collateralizability premium estimated in [Ai et al., 2018] could be confounded
with other effects related to intangible capital’s nature.
However, the fact that there is empirical evidence against the assumption in [Ai et al., 2018]
does not mean that the collateralizability premium does not exist at all. In order to test whether
the collateralizability premium exists, one can first draw a hypothesis regarding firms pledging
intangible capital as collateral by using the collateralizability premium story. At this moment, one
can slightly put aside the validity of the assumption about intangible capital’s collateralizability
and test whether the hypothesis based on the collatrealizability premium works in the empirical
world. Therefore, this paper tries to look at the collateralizability premium in another perspective
that is not tested in the [Ai et al., 2018].
Let us assume that intangible capital is not fundamentally different from tangible capital when it
is pledged as collateral. Then the role of intangible capital is simply to relax financial constraint and
give a firm an ability to increase borrowing. For example, [Mann, 2018] finds the empirical evidence
that patent collateral increases debt financing. In other words, not only tangible collateral but
also intangible collateral can provide insurance for tighter financial constraints during an economic
recession. Although it will be described in the next sections, the intangible capital was pledged
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together with tangible capital in most of the cases, which implies that firms try to relax financial
constraint more by using the intangibles in addition to the tangibles. Therefore it makes sense that
intangible capital gives additional slack in financial constraints. In this case, firms who can pledge
intangible capital should have lower stock returns if the collateralizability premium exists, compared
to the similar firms who can not pledge intangible capital. In short, if intangible capital does not have
any stark differences with tangible capital as collateral, then firms that have can pledge intangible
collateral should be considered as firms with more collateralizable assets. On the other hand, if
intangible collateral is something clearly distinguished from tangible collateral by its fundamental
nature, it may have different effects on firm variables and risks than simply relaxing financial
constraint as tangible collateral does. Thus I can test whether the collateralizability premium works
for the specific set of sample firms by looking at syndicated loans backed by intangible collateral
with proper matching exercise.
I first compare ’firm-months with intangible collateral’ and ’firm-months without intangible
collateral.’ Based on the collateral type information of the LPC Dealscan database, firm-months
are assigned a value of one if any loan pledging intangibles as collateral is not expired. Otherwise,
firm-months are assigned a value of zero.
As for preliminary examination, I run Fama-Macbeth regression and find that intangible col-
lateral positively predicts excess return going forward. Also, I compose a portfolio that takes long
positions in intangible-collateral stocks and short positions in tangible-collateral stocks monthly.
The long-short portfolio has a positive abnormal return around 8 to 10 percent (annualized) after
controlling for conventional factors.
Together with the results, I also find that the firms with intangible collateral achieve similar
or slightly higher level of leverage compared to the other firms with only tangible collateral. This
shows that the intangibles also play a role to relax financial constraints, which is assumed impossible
in the [Ai et al., 2018].
These results give an impression that the collateralizability premium might not exist or be fairly
small even if it exists for the sample firms with intangible collateral. The sample firms can clearly
relax financial constraint with intangible collateral, but they still earn higher abnormal returns.
This is against the mechanism of the collateralizability premium.
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However, in this analysis, the sample size of treated firms is small while the sample size of
control firms is large. Thus, there could be some fundamental differences in the characteristics of
treated firms and those of control firms. In order to resolve the problem and test the hypothesis
with a more rigorous setting, I match ’firms with syndicated loans that are backed by intangible
collateral’ with ’firms without syndicated loans’ based on several firm-level dimensions including
the size of intangible capital. The key is that firms are matched based on the intangible capital
level. Again, if the collateralizability premium exists, firms with intangible collateral should have
lower stock returns, compared to the matched firms that do not have any syndicated loans even
with similar level of intangible capital, because they can relax their financial constraint by pledging
the intangibles.
I use nearest-neighbor matching method allowing one match per observation. The firms with
intangible collateral are considered as treated, and they are matched with firms without syndicated
loan and intangible collateral by asset size, intangible capital level standardized by total assets,
R&D investment intensity, degree of financial constraint measured by HP Index, net debt over
sales, and access to the public debt market.
The matching analysis shows that firms with syndicated loans backed by intangible collateral
have higher stock returns than the other matched firms with similar level of intangibles but no
syndicated loans. The results are robust over several subsample periods. This evidence could be
against collateralizability premium. In other words, treated firms and matched firms have similar
level of intangible capital, intangible investment, and financial constraint, but the treated firm can
loosen the financial constraint by intangible collateral while matched firms cannot. Therefore it is
expected to see lower stock returns for treated firm and higher returns for matched firm, but the
evidence is the opposite.
In conclusion, the empirical evidence in this study does not support the fairly big collateraliz-
ability premium (8 percent annualized). The collateralizability premium might be confounded by
the effect of intangible capital.
Lastly, I add some suggestive evidence for why the firms with intangible collateral have higher
stock returns. Of course, the primary purpose of this study is to test collateralizability premium
hypothesis with different empirical data that is not used by [Ai et al., 2018] and add some coun-
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terevidence to the hypothesis. What I do in this part of the analysis is to add very brief and small
evidence that might let us know the direction of future studies regarding the intangible collateral.
I calculated the sensitivity of each treated(with intangible collateral) and matched(without
intangible collateral) portfolio to technology adoption shock in [Lin et al., 2018] as well as knowledge
capital productivity shock suggested in Chapter 1 to see whether the treated portfolio is somehow
more exposed to these risks. Hypothetically, firms that can pledge intangibles as collateral could
have better quality of intangibles and also higher intangible productivity and be more exposed to
aggregate technology adoption shock, and that is the reason the firms have higher stock returns.
I follow [Lin et al., 2018] to estimate technology adoption shock empirically. The technology
adoption shock carries a positive price of risk; therefore firms that are positively exposed to the
technology adoption shock should have higher stock returns. The technology adoption shock is
calculated by the new introduction of technology standards in the general technology field. Although
[Lin et al., 2018] estimate the technology adoption shock at a quarterly frequency, due to data
restriction, I estimate the shock at an annual frequency.
Consistent with the prediction, the portfolio of firms with intangible collateral have higher betas
to intangible capital productivity and technology adoption shock. Therefore, it is possible that
firms with intangible collateral have higher stock returns due to their higher exposure to aggregate
technology risk.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents a literature review. Section 2.3 explaines
the empricial methodology used in the analyses in detail. Section 2.4 describes the data used in the
paper. Section 2.5 presents the findings with a discussion, and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
This study contributes to the literature about intangible collateral and how it affects firms. For
example, as briefly mentioned in the previous section, [Mann, 2018] collects sample firms with
patent collateral. He shows that the pledgeability of patents is positively related to increase in
debt financing and innovation investment when creditor rights to the patent collateral is strongly
protected.
[Hochberg et al., 2018] shows that redeployability of patent collateral matters for venture lending.
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They use Dot-com crash as an unexpected capital supply shock to VCs. [Mann, 2018] also finds
similar pattern that highly redeployable patents are more likely to be pledged as collateral.
Also, [Lumioti, 2012] show that intangible collateral is credit market innovation and can alleviate
financial constraint using syndicated loan sample from Dealscan database. This paper focuses on
the determinants of usage of intangible collateral and performance of the syndicated loans backed
by intangible collateral.
While [Mann, 2018] and [Hochberg et al., 2018] focus on a specific type of intangible collateral,
this study includes all other types of intangible collateral in addition to patent collateral. [Lumioti,
2012] utilizes very similar data with data in this paper, but she does not explore the relationship
between intangible collateral and equity returns. The other two studies also examine questions
regarding credit risk and debt financing. To my knowledge, this is the first paper investigating the
relationship between intangible collateral and stock returns.
Of course, several papers have studied how incorporating intangible assets in the model changes
conclusions about firm risk and investments, but they barely focus on the effect of intangible col-
lateral.
For example, [Li et al., 2014] uses structural estimation of the q-theory augmented with in-
tangible capital investment and show that the model captures value premium and the positive
relationship between R&D intensity and stock returns better. They assume different adjustment
costs and intangible-investment-specific technological change in the model.
[Peters and Taylor, 2016] also point out that the most neoclassical theory is tested only with
physical capital investment and show that the classic q-theory performs better when intangible
capital is included in the estimation. They propose a new Tobin’s q proxy that includes intangible
capital and show that it is superior than previous Tobin’s q proxy.
[Belo et al., 2014] focuses on a specific type of intangible capital, which is brand capital. They
develop an investment-based model that incorporates brand capital and show that firms with higher
brand capital intensity have higher stock returns than firms with low brand capital intensity. The
model can explain the empirical relationship between advertising investment and stock returns.
As shown in these studies, incorporation of intangible capital improves the models’ explanatory
power for firm investments and specific empirical patterns regarding stock returns. This paper also
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contributes to this literature by introducing an empirical relationship between the intangible capital
and stock returns.
Lastly, this paper is also related to the literature about financial constraint risk and stock
returns. The empirical relationship between financial constraint risk and stock returns documented
long ago. [Lamont et al., 2015] shows that financially constrained firms’ stock returns co-move,
which suggest there is a common risk factor that those financially constrained firms are exposed
together. [Whited and Wu, 2006] also finds co-movement between financially constrained stocks
and show that the constrained firms earn higher stock returns. [LIVDAN et al., 2009] also study the
effect of financial constraint risk by solving an investment-based asset pricing model with collateral
constraints on debt capacity. In their model, collateral constraint provides inflexibility of capital
adjustment and show financially constrained firms are riskier than unconstrained firms. [HAHN
and LEE, 2009] empirically explore the similar question of how debt capacity is related to stock
returns across financially constrained and unconstrained firms. They find that debt capacity matters
specifically for financially constrained firms’ stock returns. My study also studies whether financial
constraints are related to cross-section of stock returns by testing the collateralizability premium
hypothesis, which is based on the insurance effect for tighter financial constraints.
2.3 Method
First, I identify if a firm has any loans that are backed by intangible collateral by analyzing security
type text information from Dealscan database. The procedure will be explained in detail in the next
section (Section 2.4). However, the security type is only available at loan-facility level, so I assume
that a firm is exposed to the effect of intangible collateral during the entire maturity of a loan backed
by intangible collateral. For example, if a firm enters into a contract of 5-year syndicated loan and
pledges their patents as collateral from April 2019 to April 2024, then the entire 60 months during
the period are considered as firm-months exposed to the effect of intangible collateral, either its
insurance effect or increased intangible related risk. More specifically, I assume the firm is exposed
to the effect of intangible collateral during the entire fiscal year if the firm enters into a contract at
any time of the year. Based on the assumption, I define an indicator variable IPi,t of a firm at time
t as below. Going back to the example right above, the firm’s IPi,t variable should have a value of
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Table 2.1: Comparison Groups based on Syndicated loans and Intangible collateral
Intangible Collateral
Syndicated loans (1)Yes, Yes (2)Yes, No
(3)No, Yes (4)No, No
1 from the beginning of the fiscal year 2019 to the end of the fiscal year 2024. Otherwise the IPi,t
should be 0.
IPi,t =
 1 if intangible collateral is pledged in month t0 else
As a motivating analysis, I first compare firms pledging intangible collateral(cell (1) of Table
2.1) and firms pledging only tangible collateral(cell (2) of Table 2.1). As briefly described in the
Section 2.1, intangible capital is pledged together with tangible collateral in most cases. Thus, this
comparison should provide implications regarding the effects of intangible capital when pledged in
addition to tangible capital.
I first run Fama-Macbeth cross-sectional regression to see whether the usage of intangible capital
as collateral has predictive power on future stock returns. Since it is highly likely that financial
constraint related risk can confound the result, I control for not only well-known firm-level stock
return predictors but also variables related to financial constraint including credit rating. Also, loan
characteristics are controlled, since the sample cross-section is fairly small due to the nature of the
lower frequency of intangible collateral usage. If (1) intangible capital is not fundamentally different
from tangible capital when used as collateral, and (2) collateralizability premium appropriately
explains the cross-section of sample firms, it is expected for the intangible collateral variable to
negatively predict excess return.
ri,t+1 = β0,t + β1,tIPi,t + Controlsi,t + εi,t (2.1)
Next, I construct a long-short portfolio by taking long positions in firms with intangible collateral
and short positions in firms with tangible collateral. I test whether the long-short portfolio has
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positive and significant abnormal return after controlling for conventional four factors (equation 2.2).
If the abnormal return is positive and significant, the equity return difference between intangible
collateral firms and tangible collateral firms (1) are not explained by conventional risk explanations,
and (2) could imply collateralizability premium is not applied to this case.
Similar to the Fama-Macbeth regression, if collateralizability premium exists then the portfolio
of firms with intangible collateral is expected to have lower stock returns due to the insurance effect
of their intangible capital used as collateral. Because sample firms are mostly pledging intangible
capital in addition to tangible capital as briefly mentioned in Introduction (Section 2.1), it is more
reasonable to deem that the intangible collateral is related to ease of financial constraint at least in
this sample.
ri,t = αi + β1,iMKTRFt + β2,iSMBt + β3,iHMLt + β4,iUMDt + εi,t (2.2)
I also add another evidence that shows that intangible collateral can relax financial constraint,
I run a fixed effect panel regression of next year’s firm-level leverage on intangible collateral usage.
If intangible capital is related to ease of financial constraint, then future leverage should be higher
when intangible capital is pledged. This regression setup rules out unobservable firm-level, industry-
level, and year fixed effect.
Ln(Leveragei,t+1) = const+βIP IPi,t+ΣβcontControlsi,t+FirmFE+Y earFE+IndustryFE+εi,t
(2.3)
For the next step, I perform stricter matching analysis that can provide a more accurate com-
parison to test the collateralizability premium hypothesis. I compare Cell(1) with Cell(4) in terms
of stock returns after controlling for relevant covariates by nearest neighbor matching method.
The most basic assumption behind this setting is that intangible capital and tangible capital do
not have any different nature when it comes to being pledged as collateral. In addition, if a matched
pair of firms have almost same characteristics including intangible capital related variables but one
pledges intangible capital while the other does not, then the stock return difference between the
two is mostly due to the collateralizability of their intangible capital. In this case, the former one
can benefit from the insurance effect as discussed in [Ai et al., 2018]. Therefore, the former should
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have lower stock returns than the latter. If it turns out to be opposite, then the collateralizability
premium is not able to explain the stock return of firms pledging intangible capital as collateral.
I match treated firms that have syndicated loans backed by intangible collateral with other
similar firms that do not have syndicated loans based on total asset size, intangible capital (stan-
dardized by assets), financial constraint (HP_index, net debt over sales, existence of credit ratings),
intangible investment (R&D intensity measured by R&D over total assets), and access to public
debt market.
I use nearest neighbor matching method that requires exact matches for indicator variables
such as access-to-public-debt-market but closest matches for continuous variables. All matching
dimensions have the same weights except the exact matching variables. I allow only one match for
each treated observation (firm-year). Also, I exclude poorly matched pairs before doing analysis
based on the condition that the calculated matching distance1 between two firms should be lower
than 1. This drops around 1.8 percent of the observations.
Once a matched sample is created, I form a long-short portfolio by taking long positions in
treated firms and short positions in control firms. With the stock return series of the long-short
portfolio, I run time-series regression with four factors to investigate the sign of the abnormal return
of the portfolio.
In order to check if the full sample result is driven by a specific time period, I run sub-sample
regressions. I first exclude the Dot-Com Crash period (the fiscal year 2000-2002), then early years
that intangible collaterals are barely observed (before 2000), and finally financial crisis period (2007-
2008).
Lastly, I calculate the intangible collateral portfolio’s exposure to intangible related factors in
order to briefly get a sense if there are any possible other factors that can explain the return difference
between the intangible collateral portfolio and the tangible collateral portfolio/no syndicated loan
portfolio. I estimate simple beta to knowledge capital productivity shock suggested in Chapter
1 and technology adoption shock suggested by [Lin et al., 2018]. The technology adoption shock
carries a positive price of risk according to [Lin et al., 2018] and estimated from changes in technology
standards. If the intangible collateral portfolio has nothing to do with this type of intangible related
1Euclidean norm is used.
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factors, then no beta difference is expected.
2.4 Data and Variable Construction
I obtain loan-level collateral type data from dealscan database which covers 70 to 80 percent of US
firms that files various filings to SEC. It has various information about each loan, such as borrower,
lender, secured or not, collateral type, loan type, origination country, and so many other kinds of
information. The variable security tells us the type of collateral a loan is backed by. Also, one can
read comments associated with each loan and extract additional information about collateral types
if the security variable is missing.
The sample period is from 1994 to 2015 because there is no record of intangibles used as collateral
in Dealscan database before 1994. Firmyears with intangible collaterals are identified based on loan
security information. If a firm uses intangible assets as collateral for a syndicated loan, all firmyears
within the loan’s maturity are considered as firmyears that are affected by intangible collaterals.
To be more specific, Dealscan provides facility (tranche) level information. So I first identify loan
facilities that use intangibles as collateral. I aggregate facilities over loan package level first and then
borrower firmyear level, and give a value of 1 to firmyear level intangible collateral indicator variable.
I only include corporate loans that have primary purpose2 closely related to investment following
[AlMEIDA and CAMPELLO, 2007]. Intangible assets include trademarks, brand names, customer
lists, publishing titles, licensing agreements, franchise agreement, use rights, patented technology,
software, trade secrets, and goodwill. I exclude facilities that pledge all assets of the borrower
to reduce confounding effects from for example, M&A. My sample and sample in [Lumioti, 2012]
are different because of different filtering. If I remove loan purpose filter and long term maturity
filter, I could get a similar sample in [Lumioti, 2012]. My sample is more restricted to have proper
comparability between intangibles-pledged loans and non-intangibles-pledged loans. Out of all
facilities with non-missing security information, 12.1 percent of the facilities pledge intangibles as
collateral.
From the sample of public firms, I exclude financial firms (sic code 6000 - 6999) and utility firms
(sic code 4900-4999) from the sample following the convention. There are 1,341 publics firms in
2Acquisition line, Capital expenditure, Corporate purposes, and Takeover
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the sample who use corporate loans to finance their investment-related projects between 1994 and
2015. By confining sample as above, I can control for borrower’s credit-related variables as well as
major loan characteristics that affect usage of corporate loan financing.
Among the sample firms, there are 116 firms (8.6 percent) that pledge intangibles to secure loans,
which is small but not negligible. Most of the firms have loan packages that have both intangible
secured facilities and other secured facilities. Therefore the intangible collateral effect found in this
study is the effect of pledging intangible collateral in addition to conventional collateral.
All other financial data comes from COMPUSTAT and CRSP. Firm-level intangible capital is
from [Peters and Taylor, 2016]. All the book values are based on fiscal year-end(December) values.
Size is measured at the end of June, while Book-to-Market(BE/ME) is measured at the end of
December, following conventions. The book value of equity is defined as shareholder equity(SEQ),
plus deferred taxes(TXDITC, if available), minus preferred stock(PSTK ). If SEQ is not available,
I use common equity(CEQ) plus preferred equity(PSTK ) or Asset(AT ) minus Liabilities(LT ). If
PSTK is not available, I use redemption value(PSTKRV ) or liquidation value(PSTKL). The market
value of equity is measured at the end of the fiscal year(PRCC_F x CSHO). Net Debt is defined as
total debt (DLTT + LCT) minus Cash and cash equivalents(CHE). Gross profitability is defined
as gross profits(REVT minus COGS) divided by total assets. R&D/AT is R&D expenses(XRD)
standardized by total assets. If R&D expenses are missing for firms that have any nonzero R&D
expense in the past, I assign zero. Otherwise, I exclude the firm from the sample. Momentum is
measured by multiplication of excess returns(raw) during the previous 12 months. Stock returns
are matched with previous year’s book values following Fama-Macbeth.
Net Secured Loan represents the total balance of principals of loans after amortization each
firmyear. Average Maturity of Loan is a loan-size weighted average of remaining maturities of
loans each firmyear. Following [AlMEIDA and CAMPELLO, 2007], I classify firms with credit
ratings from AAA+ to BBB- as investment grade, from BB+ to S.D. as speculation grade based
on COMPUSTAT S&P issuer long term credit ratings(splticrm). Unrated has a value of 1 if a firm
doesn’t have a long term credit rating.
The treated observations in the sample are restricted to firms with corporate loan sample, while
control observations can be drawn from firms without corporate loans but with public debt. In
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order to avoid this to confound the results, I control for whether a firm has access to the public
debt market. This information is first extracted from COMPUSTAT credit ratings. Also, I identify
firm-years with notes and bonds from debt capital structure data of Capital IQ.3 There is a variable
telling type of debt instrument (CAPITALSTRUCTURESUBTYPEID), and it is coded as 4 for
notes and bonds. If a firm has either credit rating or active notes and bonds, I give a value of 1 to
the access-to-public-debt-market variable. Otherwise, I give a value of 0.
Lastly, to estimate technology adoption shock following [Lin et al., 2018], I obtain technology
standards data from the Searle Center at Northwestern School of Law. The dataset contains tech-
nology standards that are active in each year from 1993. Each technology standards have a unique
id so that one can count number of newly adopted standards every year. The technology adoption
shock is logged growth rate of the number of unique standards in general technology fields including
IT.
2.5 Findings and Discussions
Figure 2.1 shows fraction of intangible collateral usage from 1996 to 2014. While intangible capital
was barely pledged in the ’90s, it started being used as collateral from the beginning of the 2000s.
The usage of intangible collateral peaked around the mid-2000s when the economy was in great
condition, then started decreasing after the financial crisis and around the adoption of the Dodd-
Frank Act in 2010. And it is still a relatively rare phenomenon. However, it is worthwhile to
investigate its effect on firm variables and risks because this is a relatively new pattern that is not
even assumed in many economic theories.
As shown in the Table 2.2, loan facilities that are secured by intangible collateral compose about
2 percent of the final sample. Intangibles-pledged facilities have higher LIBOR spread than non-
intangibles-pledged facilities. The pooled mean difference is 73.52 basis points, which is statistically
significantly different from zero. This could imply lenders may deem intangible collateral is not as
safe as tangible collateral and require higher loan price. [Lumioti, 2012] also find intangible pledged
loans have a higher spread. But there is no difference between the two groups in terms of the
average maturity of loans or the average loan facility amount. Note that some of the intangible
3The data is provided via WRDS.
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Figure 2.1: Ratio of firms using intangible collateral by year
pledged facilities in the sample could use other collaterals together. Therefore there is no significant
difference in maturity or facility amount at the mean level. In terms of loan types, long term
revolver/line is mostly found and then term loans. There is no noticeable difference in the types
of loans between the two groups. More than 90 percent of facilities are syndicated. In the sample,
72 percent of non-intangibles pledged facilities are for general corporate purposes, while 60 percent
of intangibles pledged facilities are for general purposes. 25 percent of intangibles pledged facilities
are for takeover, while only 14 percent of non-intangibles pledged facilities are for takeover.
Table 2.3 Among all firms that are public, covered by Dealscan, and with secured long term
corporate loans for investment purposes, 8.4 percent of firms have records of intangible collateral,
and about 5 percent of firm-months are identified as intangible collateral months. Firms pledging
intangibles as collateral are on average younger, smaller, but levered more, having bigger loans
compared to their total debt size, getting one-month-longer term loans, doing 1.5 times more R&D,
and slightly less profitable. The characteristics of intangible-collateral firms remind us of those of
financially constrained firms discussed in the literature.
Table 2.4 displays credit ratings and financial constraint status of non-intangible-pledged firm-
months and intangible-pledged firm-months. Following [Hadlock and Pierce, 2010], top tercile
firms with high HP_index are classified as financially constrained, and bottom tercile firms with
low HP_index are classified as financially unconstrained. Out of all unconstrained firm-months,
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Table 2.2: Loan Facility-level Summary Statistics
This table contains summary statistics of loan facilities included in the sample. All loan facility data is
obtained from LPC Dealscan. Sample period is from 1994 to 2014. Loans with primary purpose related to
corporate investments are included. Only long term loans (maturity > 12 months) are included. MinBps
is the minimum number of basis points added to the current interest rate level to form the current facility
interest rate or facility pricing. MaxBps is the maximum number of basis points added to the current
interest rate level. Facilities using LIBOR as current interest rate level is included for statistics related to
loan pricing. Facility amount is the size of loan facility.
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Panel A: Non Intangibles Pledge
MinBps 21,800 207.496 140.580 0 1,500
MaxBps 21,832 207.542 140.547 0 1,500
Maturity (Months) 40,543 54.342 25.227 13 288
Facility Amount($Mil) 40,505 243.898 744.965 0 32,224.147
Panel B: Intangibles Pledged
MinBps 639 281.017 112.010 80 950
MaxBps 639 281.056 112.039 80 950
Maturity (Months) 780 55.867 20.390 13 182
Facility Amount($Mil) 780 252.744 657.968 0.223 9,750.000
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Table 2.3: Firm-level Summary Statistics
This table summarizes firm level variables of non-intangible-pledged firm-months versus intangible-pledged
firm-months. The sample period is from 1994 to 2014 for firm fiscal years, and from 1995 to 2016 for CRSP
monthly returns.Intangible Pledged is an indicator variable that has value of 1 if a firmyear has secured
corporate loan pledging intangibles as collateral. Firm level intangible capital is from [Peters and Taylor,
2016]. All the book values are based on fiscal year-end(December) values. Size is measured at the end of
June, while Book-to-Market(BE/ME) is measured at the end of December, following conventions. The book
value of equity is defined as shareholder equity(SEQ), plus deferred taxes(TXDITC, if available), minus
preferred stock(PSTK ). If SEQ is not available, I use common equity(CEQ) plus preferred equity(PSTK )
or Asset(AT ) minus Liabilities(LT ). If PSTK is not available, I use redemption value(PSTKRV ) or liqui-
dation value(PSTKL). The market value of equity is measured at the end of fiscal year(PRCC_F x CSHO).
Net Secured Loan represents total balance of principals of loans after amortization each firmyear. Average
Maturity of Loan is loan-size weighted average of remaining maturities of loans each firmyear. Following
[AlMEIDA and CAMPELLO, 2007], I classify firms with credit ratings from AAA+ to BBB- as investment
grade, from BB+ to S.D. as speculation grade based on COMPUSTAT S&P issuer long term credit rat-
ings(splticrm). Unrated has value of 1 if a firm doesn’t have long term credit rating. Net Debt is defined as
total debt (DLTT + LCT) minus Cash and cash equivalents(CHE). Gross profitability is defined as gross
profits(REVT minus COGS) divided by total assets. R&D/AT is R&D expenses(XRD) standardized by
total assets. If R&D expenses is missing for firms have nonzero R&D expense in the past, I assign zero.
Momentum is measured by multiplication of excess returns(raw) during previous 12 months.
N Mean S.D. MIN MAX
Panel A: Non-intangible collateral months
Age 85,617 26.190 18.650 1.000 89
Assets 85,617 6,139.440 17,930.340 4.131 355,935
Size 85,617 6,361.050 14,364.600 5.069 76,688.570
BE/ME 85,617 0.567 0.448 0.050 3.303
Momentum 85,573 -0.987 0.067 -1.000 -0.349
Net Debt / Sale 85,509 0.381 0.469 -1.652 5.732
Debt / Assets 85,617 0.453 0.173 0.006 1.947
Net Secured Loan / Debt 85,617 0.707 0.794 0.004 5.518
Average Maturity 85,617 37.670 18.600 0.000 152
R&D / Assets 85,617 0.039 0.048 0.000 0.240
Gross Profitability 85,617 0.348 0.170 -0.073 1.084
Number of Firms 1,263
Panel B: Intangible collateral months
Age 4,486 19.609 16.757 1.000 65
Assets 4,486 2,094.630 3,678.357 7.932 25,458
Size 4,486 1,828.780 2,980.720 5.069 33,356.85
BE/ME 4,486 0.566 0.482 0.051 3.304
Momentum 4,474 -0.983 0.079 -1.000 -0.349
Net Debt / Sale 4,462 0.470 0.712 -1.652 5.732
Debt / Assets 4,486 0.497 0.171 0.082 0.946
Net Secured Loan / Debt 4,486 0.856 0.842 0.007 5.518
Average Maturity 4,486 38.210 17.608 0.000 84
R&D / Assets 4,486 0.061 0.067 0.000 0.240
Gross Profitability 4,486 0.320 0.183 -0.073 1.080
Number of Firms 116
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics: Financial Constraints
This table summarizes credit status of non-intangible-pledged firm-months versus intangible-pledged firm-
months. Following [AlMEIDA and CAMPELLO, 2007], I classify firms with credit ratings from AAA+ to
BBB- as Investment grade, from BB+ to S.D. as Speculation grade based on COMPUSTAT S&P issuer
long term credit ratings(splticrm). Unrated has value of 1 if a firm doesn’t have long term credit rating.
Constrained and Unconstrained firms are identified by Hadlock and Pierce’s financial constraint index(below
HP_index). HP_index is calculated by −0.737Size+0.043Size2−0.040Age. Size is adjusted by gdp deflator
in 2009 dollars. Age is current year minus the very first year appearing in COMPUSTAT with non-missing
stock price. Top tercile with high HP_index is considered constrained, while bottom tercile is considered
unconstrained. All variables are indicator variables, thus mean value represents percentage of firm-months
having value of 1 for each variable.
Non-intangible firm-months Intangible firm-months
count mean count mean
Panel A: Credit Ratings
Unrated 85,617 0.4914 4,486 0.4561
Speculation grade 85,617 0.3674 4,486 0.5439
Investment grade 85,617 0.1411 4,486 0.0000
Panel B: Financial Constraint
Constrained 85,617 0.0998 4,486 0.2345
Unconstrained 85,617 0.5932 4,486 0.3629
only 3.2 percent is identified as intangible pledged firm-months, while 12.3 percent is identified as
intangible pledged firm-months among the constrained sample. However, among intangible-pledged
firm-months, 36.3 percent is unconstrained while 23.5 percent is constrained. Also, intangible
firm-months are composed of more portion of speculation grade borrowers than non-intangible
firm-months. 7.76 percent of speculation grade group is identified as intangible-collateral pledged.
There is no intangibles-pledged firm-month in investment grade group and 4.86 percent of firm-
months in the unrated group is identified as intangible-pledged firm-months. In sum, overall firms
with intangible collateral are more likely to be facing tighter financial constraints and lower credit
rating.
Table 2.5 contains Fama-Macbeth cross-sectional regression on IPi,t variable with other control
variables. The results show that pledging intangibles could make cross-sectional differences in stock
returns. Pledging intangibles as collateral increases stock returns by 0.9 percentage points per
month, annualized 10.8 percentage points. According to [Ai et al., 2018], firms with a higher ratio
of intangible capital should have higher stock returns than the other firms with a lower ratio of it,
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because intangible capital cannot provide insurance for economic downturns and tighter financial
constraint. Af first glance, this result seems to support the collateralizability premium. However,
the sample used in this study violates their assumption and mechanism because intangible capital
is used as collateral and it might help relax financial constraints. If it turns out that intangible
collateral relaxes financial constraints, then we would not expect to see higher stock returns for
the firms pledging intangible collateral for corporate loans. Therefore, this evidence is interesting
enough to motivate us to explore whether we can find empirical evidence consistent with/against
the collateralizability premium with this specific sample.
In addition to the cross-sectional regression in Table 2.5, the results of time-series regression in
Table 2.6 show that the firms with intangible collateral have not only higher average returns but
also abnormal returns. The dependent variable is a long-short portfolio’s return that takes long
positions in intangible collateral stocks and short positions in the tangible collateral stocks. Even
after controlling for the conventional four factors, the abnormal return of the intangible collateral
portfolio is positive and significant. It is also an economically significant level of 9.6 percent to 12
percent annualized.
Table 2.7 shows that pledging intangible is positively associated with higher book leverage after
controlling for conventional leverage determinants. If a firm has intangible collateral, the next
year’s leverage of the firm increases by about 10 percentage points evaluated at the mean logged
leverage level (-2.3, 9.8% in raw value). One possible scenario for the firms with intangible capital
is that, together with the result in Table 2.4, they currently face tighter financial constraint and
use intangible capital as collateral to relax financial constraints so that their next year leverage
increases.
Different from what we have typically assumed in the literature that only tangible capital is
pledgeable and safe, the intangibles do play a role as collateral to secure corporate loans. Therefore
this contradicts the first assumption of the collateralizability premium that intangible capital is not
pledgeable. In addition, this provides support for performing another matching exercise to look at
whether the higher returns of the firms with intangible collateral is against the collateralizability
premium channel, because stock return should be lower for the firms who can benefit from the
insurance effect of intangible collateral that can relax financial constraint and increase borrowing.
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Table 2.5: Fama-Macbeth Regression: Pledging intangibles and Cross-section of Stock
Returns
This table contains Fama-Macbeth regression of excess returns(percent) on intangibles used as collateral
and various controls. The sample period is from 1994 to 2014 for firm fiscal years, and from 1995 to
2015 for CRSP monthly returns.Intangible Pledged is an indicator variable that has value of 1 if a firmyear
has secured corporate loan pledging intangibles as collateral. Firm level intangible capital is from [Peters
and Taylor, 2016]. Net secured loan represents total balance of principals of loans after amortization each
firmyear. Average Maturity of Loan is loan-size weighted average of remaining maturities of loans each
firmyear. Following [AlMEIDA and CAMPELLO, 2007], I classify firms with credit ratings from AAA+ to
BBB- as investment grade, from BB+ to S.D. as speculation grade based on COMPUSTAT S&P issuer long
term credit ratings(splticrm). Unrated has value of 1 if a firm doesn’t have long term credit rating. Net
Debt is defined as total debt (DLTT + LCT) minus Cash and cash equivalents(CHE). Knowledge Capital
is total amount of intangible capital related to R&D and patents([Peters and Taylor, 2016]). Momentum
is measured by multiplication of excess returns(raw) during previous 12 months (July of year t-1 to June
of year t). 1 digit SIC code is used to control for industry fixed effect. All independent variables except
indicator variables are winsorized at 1%.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Ex.Ret Ex.Ret Ex.Ret
Intangibles Pledged(IP) 0.823* 0.905** 0.935**
(0.422) (0.427) (0.440)
Net Secured Loan/Debt -0.00643
(0.0717)






Net Debt/Sale -0.259 -0.196 -0.297
(0.219) (0.235) (0.299)




Gross Profitability 0.294* 0.173 0.238
(0.169) (0.188) (0.167)
BE/ME 0.413** 0.501** 0.302**
(0.168) (0.212) (0.120)
Size 0.000208 0.0188 -0.0369
(0.0623) (0.0656) (0.0720)
Momentum 0.00175 0.00220 0.00905
(0.0179) (0.0176) (0.0192)
Constant 2.138** 0.940 0.135
(1.049) (0.801) (0.869)
Observations 91,126 88,281 85,400
R-squared 0.091 0.104 0.123
Number of months 264 264 264
Industry FE YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.6: Time Series Regression: Intangible-pledging Portfolio minus Non-intangible-
pledging Portfolio
This table contains time series regression of excess return differences between intangible collateral firms and
non-intangible collateral firms on conventional asset pricing factors. The sample period is from 1994 to
2014 for firm fiscal years, and from 1995 to 2016 for CRSP monthly returns. Portfolio returns are equally
weighted.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Ret. Diff. Ret. Diff. Ret. Diff.
Alpha 1.011*** 0.962** 0.808*
(0.415) (0.416) (0.413)








R-Square 0.0003 0.0099 0.0472
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
If collateralizability premium works for the sample in this study, one can expect to see lower stock
returns for the intangible collateral group than the tangible collateral group, taking into account
the fact that intangible capital is pledged together with tangible capital most of the cases in the
sample.
Accordingly, the next analysis tries to refine the sample by matching on several dimensions that
are relevant to intangible collateral usage and a firm’s financing ability and constraint. All the main
results until here are done with the less sophisticated sample that compares a fairly small number of
treated firms and a drastically larger number of control firms, even though several control variables
are thrown in the Fama-Macbeth regression and Leverage regression. Therefore, as described in
Section 2.3, I show the matched sample results in Table 2.8 and 2.9 that compare Cell (1) and Cell
(4) of Table 2.1.
Table 2.8 shows averages of variables used in the matching analysis to compare Cell(1) and
Cell(4) of Table 2.1. The treated firms are matched on asset size, financial constraint (HP Index),
intangible capital standardized by assets, R&D intensity, and access to the public debt market. The
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Table 2.7: Panel Regression: Leverage
This table contains fixed effect panel regression of book leverage on Intangible collateral indicator variable and
other controls. Liquidity is defined as cash flow(EBIT) over assets(AT). Tangibility is estimated following
[AlMEIDA and CAMPELLO, 2007], CHE + 0.715RECT +0.547INVT + 0.535PPENT. For the rest of
variables please see: Table 2.5. The leverage is in log value and so other control variables are except
indicator variables (Unrated, Speculation grade).
(1)
VARIABLES Leverage




















Firm FE, Year FE, Industry FE YES
Clustered Firm
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.8: Matched Sample Summary Stats
Control Treat
Assets 2378.274 2563.971
HP Index -3.517 -3.525
Intangible Capital / AT 0.596 0.607
Net Debt / SALE 0.319 0.480
R&D / AT 0.030 0.031
Avg. No. Firms (month) 42.330
nearest neighbor matching results return average distance of 0.126, and all the dimensions except
for net debt over sales are very closely matched. Due to the small sample size of treated firms
and one-to-one matching method, the average number of firms per month is around 42. With this
matched sample, I form treated and control portfolios. Then I form a long-short portfolio by long
the treated portfolio and short the control portfolio.
Table 2.9 shows if this long-short portfolio shows any significant portion of the returns that are
not explained by conventional asset pricing factors. Column (1) of Table 2.9 is a full-sample time
series regression result, and it is clearly shown that α is positive and significant, with an annualized
return of 6 percent. Therefore, it is plausible that the treated firms, which have syndicated loans
backed by intangible collateral, have higher stock returns than other similar firms in terms of
intangible capital, intangible investment, size, and financial constraint. This could be evidence
against the collateralizability premium. The matched firms have similar intangible capital and
investment and financial constraint, but they can not pledge it to borrow using syndicated loans.
The collateralizability premium story should predict that these matched firms should have higher
stock returns because they lack collateralizable intangible capital even if they have similar amount
of intangible capital.
In order to investigate if the result is driven by some specific time period, I plot time-series
returns of the long-short portfolio as in Figure 2.2. Because of the small number of observations
before the year 2000, the graph is very volatile. Other than this, the Dot-com Crash period and
Financial Crisis period also show relatively more volatile patterns. Therefore in Column(2), (3), and
(4), I run the same time series regression excluding the specific periods that might solely drive the
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Table 2.9: Time Series Regression: Firms with Syndicated loans backed by Intangible
Collateral minus Matched Firms without Syndicated Loans
This table contains time series regression of excess return differences between intangible collateral firms and
non-intangible collateral firms on conventional asset pricing factors. The sample period is from 1994 to
2014 for firm fiscal years, and from 1995 to 2016 for CRSP monthly returns. Portfolio returns are equally
weighted. Column (1) contains full sample results. Column (2) excludes Dot-com crash period in early 2000s
from 2000 to 2002. Column (3) excludes years before 2000 in which data is very noisy due to low number of
observations. Column (4) excludes financial crisis period from 2008 to 2009.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Ret. Diff. Ret Diff Ret Diff Ret Diff
α 0.501*** 0.551*** 0.441*** 0.474***
(0.0938) (0.0986) (0.105) (0.102)
MktRF 0.0127 0.00661 -0.00327 0.0278
(0.0238) (0.0256) (0.0299) (0.0273)
SMB 0.0266 0.0363 0.118** 0.00536
(0.0425) (0.0479) (0.0474) (0.0412)
HML 0.113*** 0.115*** 0.0509 0.121***
(0.0341) (0.0381) (0.0411) (0.0417)
UMD 0.0810** 0.0627 0.0995** 0.103***
(0.0321) (0.0383) (0.0454) (0.0295)
Observations 252 216 180 228
R-squared 0.107 0.057 0.157 0.126
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
result. Column (2) excludes Dot-com crash period in the early 2000s from 2000 to 2002. Dot-com
crash is somewhat important for the result because the r-squared is slightly higher than half of the
r-squared in full sample analysis (column(1)). Although r-squared decreases by half compared to
the r-squared of column(1), the abnormal return of column(2) is greater than that of column(1)
and still statistically significant. Column (3) excludes years before 2000 in which data is very noisy
due to the low number of observations. Column (4) excludes financial crisis period from 2008 to
2009. Similar to the result of Column (2), the abnormal returns are positive and significant for the
sub-periods in Column (3) and (4). Of course the magnitude of α decreases by 0.026 percentage
points per month (Column (1) vs. Column (4)), this is only around 0.36 percentage point of yearly
return. Therefore, it is shown that the abnormal return of the long-short portfolio is not just driven























































Figure 2.2: Long-Short Portfolio’s Monthly Returns over Time
This figure is a time series plot of stock returns of firms having syndicated loan back by intangible collateral
minus stock returns of matched firms not having syndicated loan. Firms are matched by asset size, R&D
investments, financial constraint measured by HP index, public debt market access, and intangible capital
standardized by total assets.
Then why do the firms with intangible collateral have higher stock return even with the ability
to relax financial constraint? Although this is beyond the scope of this paper and should be studied
in a separate paper, I provide a suggestive hypothesis briefly before I wrap up the discussion of
this chapter. In connection with Chapter 1, the firms with intangible capital could possibly be
more exposed to any risk sources that are closely related to intangible investment, productivity,
or aggregate technology adoption shock. Hence I calculate sensitivities of the treated and control
portfolios to knowledge capital productivity shock suggested in Chapter 1 and technology adoption
shock following [Lin et al., 2018]. Note that technology adoption shock beta is estimated from
20-year time series data at an annual frequency, so the beta might not be very stable.
Table 2.10 shows that the treated firms have higher betas than the control firms. One can
carefully conjecture that the firms with intangible collateral could be more exposed to intangible
or technology related risks by looking at the difference in betas. It would be interesting to study
why intangible collaterals should be related to technology risk or intangible productivity risk. Of
course, there is still a possibility that collateralizability premium can explain the findings in this
paper. For example, if intangible collateral relaxes financial constraint less than tangible collateral
does, then the benefit from the insurance effect of the collateral is smaller for firms with intangible
collateral than firms with tangible collateral. In this case, firms with intangible collateral could have
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Table 2.10: Exposure to Technology Adoption S hock
This table contains betas of treated portfolio and matched portfolio to aggregate technology adoption shock
and knowledge capital productivity shock. The technology adoption shock is estimated following [Lin et al.,
2018]. Knowledge capital productivity shock is estimated following Section 1.3. The treated portfolio
contains firms with syndicated loans backed by intangible collateral. The control portfolio in Panel A
contains firms without syndicated loans. The control portfolio in Panel B contains firms with only tangible
collateral.
βknow βtech
Panel A: Cell(1) vs. Cell(4) in Table 2.1
Treat 0.93 0.08
Control 0.52 0.04
Panel A: Cell(1) vs. Cell(2) in Table 2.1
Treat 0.94 0.08
Control 0.31 -0.05
higher stock returns than firms with tangible collateral by the mechanism of the collateralizability
premium model. However, the deeper discussion on why the firms with intangible collateral have
higher stock returns than firms with tangible collateral only is off from the central purpose of this
essay, and I leave it for future study.
2.6 Conclusion
By using LPC Dealscan data, I test the collateralizability premium hypothesis to explain higher
stock returns of firms with intangible collateral. In the motivating analysis, I find statistically
and economically significant stock returns for firms with intangible collateral than firms with only
tangible collateral. The long-short portfolio has positive abnormal returns around 8 to 10 percent
(annualized) after controlling for conventional factors.
Together with the results, I find evidence that intangible collateral can relax financial constraint
by the panel regression of leverage on Intangible collateral indicator variable. The firms with
intangible collateral achieve similar or slightly higher level of leverage compared to the other firms
with only tangible collateral.
These results act as counter-evidence for the collateralizability premium hypothesis. What
the evidence tells us is that the Sample firms can clearly relax financial constraint with intangi-
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ble collateral, but they still earn higher abnormal returns. This is against the mechanism of the
collateralizability premium that firms with higher collateralizability should earn lower stock returns.
In order to support my findings more, I perform matching exercises and compare the stock
returns of firms with syndicated loans backed by intangible collateral and other firms without the
syndicated loans even with the same level of intangible capital and R&D investments. The firms
with syndicated loans backed by intangible collateral are expected to have lower stock returns than
the matched firms without syndicated loans because they are more likely to have intangible capital
with higher collateralizability.
Even with the nearest neighbor matching exercise, I find evidence against the collateralizability
premium hypothesis that firms with intangible collateral still have significantly higher abnormal
returns around 6 percent per year. The results are robust over several subsample periods.
In sum, even if firms have higher collateralizability, it does not have lower stock returns. Of
course, the findings in this study do not fully rule out the existence of the collateralizability premium
due to the small sample problem, one possible conclusion that can be drawn from the findings is that
the collateralizability premium in [Ai et al., 2018] might be confounded by the effect of intangible
capital which is independent with financial constraint.
Lastly, I show that intangible collateral portfolio has higher betas to technology-related shocks.
Thus, it might be the case that firms with intangible collateral have higher stock returns due to
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